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ABSTRACT
The growing number of new technologies in food production—
such as nanotechnology, genetic modification, animal cloning, and
irradiation—are garnering different regulatory responses around
the world. Based on their threshold for tolerating risk, countries
are asserting their national right to regulate at home using labeling,
quarantine, and outright bans on foods. But domestic regulation
has its limits in a free trade environment. Countries that are not
mindful of treaty obligations could face legal liability, as seen in
the recent litigation between Uruguay and Philip Morris International. In short, traditional models of international regulatory cooperation (IRC) are failing to provide countries with sufficient regulatory latitude within a free trade framework.
New Mega-Regional agreements provide a renewed momentum to advance cooperation. In 2012, President Obama issued an
executive order to prompt federal agencies to engage in IRC and
championed two important IRC initiatives, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partner* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado Law School. J.D.,
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ship. Obscured by the criticism of the TPP (including by both major parties in the 2016 U.S. Presidential election) is its development
of a novel framework that promises to integrate domestic regulatory oversight and free trade goals. As this Article explains, the TPP
is (1) an exemplar of a Mega-Regional trade framework, (2) a new
promising mechanism for IRC, and (3) a way to achieve higher
food safety outcomes. In so doing, it underscores how the TPP enhances regulatory cooperation with a menu of new treaty offerings
that nudge countries to regulate in ways unrecognized in the IRC
literature. Given the rapid pace of new food technologies, the inability to resolve international conflicts with traditional means, and
impending trade disputes, the model of IRC developed in this article provides an effective solution to a growing challenge in the international trade regime.

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/1

2016]

RIGHT TO REGULATE

3

TABLE OF CONTENTS
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.
6.

Introduction: A New Regulatory World ....................................4
A Growing Demand for More Regulatory Cooperation ........14
2.1. Defining International Regulatory Cooperation .....................14
2.2. Food Safety Threats and Challenges ........................................21
2.3. Competing Philosophical Approaches to Regulating...............24
2.4. Regulatory ‘Collisions’ ............................................................33
2.5. ‘Imminent’ Regulatory Collisions ...........................................40
The Problem: Current Treaties Do Not Meet
the Demand for More Cooperative Regulation .................................................................................................43
3.1. The ‘Wish List’ for Expanding Cooperative Regulation to
Increase Food Safety ........................................ .…………..…44
3.2. Comparing Traditional Agreements with the ‘Wish List’ .......47
Solution: The Mega-Regional as a Framework For Enhanced
Cooperative Regulation ..............................................................51
4.1. Mega-Regionals Expand Cooperation Found in Traditional
Treaties ................................................................................... 51
4.2. Mega-Regionals Provide New Mechanisms for Regulatory Cooperation ..................................................................................56
Externalities ..................................................................................60
5.1. Positive Externalities .............................................................. 60
5.2. Negative Externalities .............................................................61
Conclusions ..................................................................................64
Appendix ......................................................................................67

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

4

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 38:1

1. INTRODUCTION: A NEW REGULATORY WORLD
We are living in a new regulatory reality marked by two growing trends. Across the globe, trade negotiators are busy drafting
new trade agreements to expand markets. Meanwhile, at home,
food regulators are drafting rules to keep pace with the global development of new food technologies—such as genetic modification, animal cloning, irradiation, and nanotechnology1—in an effort
to maintain a high level of health and safety protection. Striking
the balance between maintaining national policy autonomy while
opening markets is an increasing challenge.
Countries have an inherent right to regulate in the public interest, a basic act of sovereignty under international law,2 and they do
so with varying levels of protection depending on the risktolerance levels of the nations’ respective citizenries. While this
fundamental right to regulate is recognized in most free trade
agreements,3 it has limits. A new wave of international lawsuits
1 See e.g., Letter from Rosa L. DeLauro et al., U.S. House of Representatives,
to Michael Froman, Ambassador, U.S. Trade Representative (Oct. 21, 2015)
http://delauro.house.gov/images/pdf/03.19.15USTRDataLetter.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/CT26-ZRS4] (recounting the Vietnam catfish food safety issue) [hereinafter Letter from Rosa L. DeLauro]; see also Froman Says TPP SPS Chapter is Subject
to Dispute Settlement, with RMM, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 16, 2015 (arguing that the
TPP includes dispute settlement procedures consistent with food and agriculture
industry demands).
2 See generally Markus Wagner, Regulatory Space in International Trade Law and
International Investment Law, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L., at 1 (2015) (noting that states retain their authority to regulate in policymaking even when joining the WTO and
signing international investment treaties) [hereinafter Wagner, Regulatory Space].
See also Howard Mann, Comment, The Right of States to Regulate and International
Investment Law, in THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF FDI: POLICY AND RULEMAKING
PERSPECTIVES, at 189 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
2003) (discussing the balance between a state’s right to regulate and complying
with trade and investment agreements).
3 For an example of a trade agreement that reaffirms a country’s right to regulate,
see
Preamble
to
TRANS-PACIFIC
PARTNERSHIP,
available
at
https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPP-Final-Text-Preamble.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/Y9V2-F5FA] (“Recognize [state’s] inherent right to regulate and resolve
to preserve the flexibility of the Parties to set legislative and regulatory priorities,
safeguard public welfare, and protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as
public health, safety, the environment, the conservation of living or non-living exhaustible natural resources, the integrity and stability of the financial system and
public morals”). See also Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement
(CETA), Can.-E.U., art. 8.9, para. 1, opened for signature Dec. 2015,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_154329.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8BQU-36HE] [hereinafter CETA] (“For the purpose of this
Chapter, the Parties reaffirm their right to regulate within their territories to
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challenging domestic public health regulations illustrates that
countries are not afraid to invoke international treaties to reverse
domestic law.4 In an era marked by more agreements and rapidly
advancing technologies in food production, new forms of regulatory cooperation are needed to provide countries with sufficient regulatory latitude within a free trade network. An example illustrates this need.
Take for example nanotechnology. The “Gobstopper” – a round,
brightly-colored, marble-like confectionery made of sugary layers
sold in grocery stores in the United States. Gobstoppers are coated
with submicroscopic particles (nanoparticles), which measure less
than 100 nanometers (technology at the scale of atoms and molecules) of titanium dioxide,5 an ingredient commonly added to plasachieve legitimate policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety,
the environment or public morals, social or consumer protection or the promotion
and protection of cultural diversity.”). The language in the European UnionVietnam Free Trade Agreement, Article 13 bis, para. 1, is nearly the same. European Union-Vietnam Free Trade Agreement, E.U.-VT, opened for signature Feb. 1,
2016, available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2016/february/tradoc_
154210.pdf [https://perma.cc/S8TG-UWG4].
4 For an example of a challenge to domestic legislation, see the international
investment litigation between Philip Morris International and Australia and Uruguay, respectively. In both cases, the countries defended public health measures
and won. In Australia’s case (decided 17, December 2015), the investment treaty
was a Hong Kong-Australia Bilateral Investment Treaty. Philip Morris Asia, Ltd.
v. Australia, Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility PCA Case Repository No.
2012-12, (Hong Kong Treaty Arbitration Tribunal), http://www.italaw.com/
sites/default/files/case-documents/italaw7303_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/7SFBMEDY]. For a discussion of the genesis of this case, see Wagner, Regulatory Space,
supra note 2, at 6 – 7.
In Uruguay’s case, decided in July, 2016 the investment treaty was a UruguaySwitzerland investment treaty. Philip Morris Brands Sàrl v. Oriental Republic of
Uruguay,
ICSID
Case
No.
ARB/10/7,
Award
(July
8,
2016),
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/content/press_office/2016/2016_07_08_
uruguay.pdf [https://perma.cc/BQ33-YQME].
In 2016, the United Kingdom’s High Court upheld its country’s plain packaging law, and the European Union’s Court of Justice upheld its new tobacco regulations, including a requirement for large, graphic health warnings for EU countries
to adopt plain packaging. British American Tobacco et. al v. Dept. of Health
(2016),
EWHC
1169
(Admin),
https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wpcontent/uploads/2016/05/bat-v-doh.judgment.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2DCYXXPP]; Press Release No 48/16, Court of Justice of the European Union, The new
EU
directive
on
tobacco
products
is
valid
(May
4,
2016),
http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/201605/cp160048en.pdf [https://perma.cc/7DEG-N68X].
5 See Ravi Ravichandran, Nanotechnology Applications in Food and Food Processing: Innovative Green Approaches, Opportunities and Uncertainties for Global Market, INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF GREEN NANOTECHNOLOGY: PHYSICS AND CHEMISTRY,
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tics, paint, cosmetics and sunscreen, and is also a food additive
used in hundreds of foods6 to whiten or brighten color.7 And because it contains nanoparticles of this approved food additive, a
Gobstopper can be considered a nanofood.8
Countries are racing to regulate nanotechnology. While in the
U.S., nanofoods are Food and Drug Administration (FDA)approved and generally recognized as safe,9 other countries limit
nanotechnology in foods due to concerns that ingested nanoparticles are so small that they may interact with cells or behave differently than their larger counterparts.10 The European Union has
approved nanotechnology ingredients but requires labeling,11 a
Vol 1:2, 72, 85 (2010) (noting other nanoparticle used in foods, such as: silicon dioxide, iron oxide, silver, gold, and aluminum).
6 See generally World Health Organization, FAO/WHO Expert Meeting on the
Application of Nanotechnologies in the Food and Agriculture Sectors: Potential Food Safety Implications, Food and Agriculture Association of the United Nations and World
Health
Organization,
Meeting
Report
(2010),
http://www.evira.fi/
attachments/elintarvikkeet/elintarviketietoa/fao_who_nano_expert_meeting_
report_final__2_.pdf [https://perma.cc/56ZQ-KZUM] [hereinafter FAO/WHO
Expert Meeting].
7 Id. FAO Report, Appendix 4 (listing “current and projected nanotechnology
applications in the food and agriculture sectors” in FAO study). See also Susan
Gaidos, Noshing on Nano: The tiny particles in what we eat raise big questions, 188 SCI.
NEWS 18 (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.sciencenews.org/article/nanoparticlesfoods-raise-safety-questions [https://perma.cc/D4F9-YHK6] (explaining that “titanium dioxide nanoparticles are frequently added to foods to whiten or brighten
color.”). See generally David Julian McClements, Nanoscale Nutrient Delivery Systems for Food Applications: Improving Bioactive Dispersibility, Stability and Bioavailability, 180 J. FOOD SCI. 80, N1602 (July 2015) (discussing the use of nanotechnology in
food production).
8 See Gaidos, supra note 7, at 18 (noting that the Gobstopper candy includes
submicroscopic particles of titanium dioxide, a food additive).
9 U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., SUMMARY OF COLOR ADDITIVES FOR USE IN THE
UNITED STATES IN FOODS, DRUGS, COSMETICS, AND MEDICAL DEVICES (2015)
[https://perma.cc/7SE9-76HD] [hereinafter FDA, SUMMARY OF COLOR ADDITIVES].
10 Id. at 19 (including a list of approved color additive for use in food, drugs,
cosmetics, and medical devices).
11 See generally CHRISTIAN HÄBERLI, WORLD TRADE INSTITUTE, A Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement: Implications for Swiss Agriculture,
at 15, http://www.nccr-trade.org/fileadmin/user_upload/nccr-trade.ch/wp5/
publications/Haeberli_TTIP_Implications_for_Swiss_Agriculture.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N4E4-DGUH] [hereinafter Haberli, Implications for Swiss Agriculture]. For the U.S. nanotechnology requirements, see U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN.,
NANOTECHNOLOGY (2009) (noting that the FDA regulates products, not technologies).
In the United States, the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) require
manufacturers to demonstrate that the food ingredients and food products are not
harmful to health. Yet this regulation does not specifically cover nanoparticles,
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move which ultimately limits Gobstopper exports and can be perceived as a trade barrier.
The problem is that ultimately these disparate regulatory approaches may lead to a trade-related dispute because traditional
forms of international regulatory cooperation (IRC) have difficulty
resolving disputes related to new food technologies.12 Generally,
IRC is made up of arrangements (e.g., provisions in trade agreements, international organizations, and standards) like the World
Trade Organization (WTO), that “promote cooperation in the design, monitoring, enforcement, and management of regulation to
support consistent rules among Members.”13 But the WTO relies
upon international organizations to set standards for new technologies and, as is the case with many new technologies, no international standards are available for nanofoods.14 In addition, political and philosophical tensions often related to new technologies

which could become harmful only in nanosized applications. Thus no special regulations exist for the use of nanotechnology in the food industry.
12 For instance, if two countries bring a claim to the WTO, the country violating the WTO rule may decide to continue to violate the trade rule and merely pay
a penalty. The issue remains unresolved. See Memorandum of Understanding,
European Communities - Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
WT/DS26/28 (Sep. 30, 2009), http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2009/
november/tradoc_145411.pdf [https://perma.cc/M6QY-MJYE] [hereinafter EUMeat Products] (listing an example of such a dispute).
13 See Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Mapping A Hidden World of International Regulatory
Cooperation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., 267 (2015) [hereinafter Dunoff, Mapping a
Hidden World]. See also Céline Kauffmann & Nikolai Malyshev, Think Piece, International Regulatory Co-operation: The Menu of Approaches, OECD E15 Task Force on
Regulatory Systems Coherence at 1 (Oct. 2015), http://e15initiative.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/E15-Regulatory-Kauffmann-and-Malyshev-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KM8K-6XQV] (explaining that “governments use and combine a broad range of formal and informal, broad and specific mechanisms to
achieve their co-operation objectives” regarding economic regulation) [hereinafter
Kauffman & Malyshev, International Regulatory Cooperation].
14 See Steve Suppan, Racing Ahead: U.S. Agri-nanotechnology in the Absence of
Regulation, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y at 4 (June 2011),
http://www.iatp.org/files/2011.6.29%20AgriNanotech%20SS.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/PG45-YSYR] (noting, in July of 2011 that the Codex Commission, the
international food–setting organization, may consider whether or not to include
nanotechnology in its strategic plan for 2013-2018); FAO/WHO Expert Report,
supra note 6, at 88 (showing that the current Codex plan does not include nanotechnology). See also WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Strategic Plan 2014 – 2019,
ftp://ftp.fao.org/codex/Publications/StrategicFrame/Strategic_plan_2014_2019_
EN.pdf (stating that it will address emerging food safety and nutrition issues to
include scientific and technological innovation which may include nanotechnology).
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prevent adequate dispute resolution.15 The slow pace of global
standard-setting in this area and the inability of the WTO to resolve these issues, signals a need for a ‘right to regulate cooperatively’—or a right to access new mechanisms for regulatory cooperation.
This Article argues that, when it comes to food safety, the
harms caused by regulatory pluralism outweigh the benefits.16 The
Gobstopper example, and others, illustrate that the need for more
harmonization of standards, guidelines, and processes is driven by
foods perceived as risks,17 intensifying regulatory differences with
15 In a hypothetical WTO Claim, the United States would argue that the regulation (or ‘trade measure’ in the WTO) violates a relevant WTO agreement. The
ban could be upheld by a WTO Panel if justified using scientific evidence and if
no international standard on nanofoods exists. Two long standing unresolved
WTO disputes are EU-Bananas and EU-Hormones. See Commission Regulation,
No. 2257/94 (Sept. 16, 1994) (laying down the Quality Standards for Bananas
within the European Communities). See also EU-Meat Products, supra note 12, at 1
(presenting a memorandum of understanding between the US and EU on meat
quality). See e.g. THOMAS HALE, DAVID HELD & KEVIN YOUNG, GRIDLOCK: WHY
GLOBAL COOPERATION IS FAILING WHEN WE NEED IT MOST (2013) (arguing that treaties and other forms of legal cooperation are increasingly inadequate).
16 For an argument based on benefits, see Kauffmann & Malyshev, International Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 13, at 1 – 4 (noting “divergences threaten
coordinated policy action, hamper interoperability, and raise… costs for businesses and citizens”, versus the benefits, including increased trade, investment and
GDP, “administrative efficiency gains and cost savings for government, business
and citizens” and “societal benefits such as improved safety” and environmental
sustainability.).
See also ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND
DEVELOPMENT (OECD), INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY CO-OPERATION: ADDRESSING
GLOBAL CHALLENGES 15 (2013) (noting that the single largest obstacle to enhanced
international trade is the persistence of disparities between nations’ regulations);
Benjamin M. Weadon, International Regulatory Arbitrage Resulting from Dodd-Frank
Derivatives Regulation, 16 N.C. BANKING INST. 249, 251, 259 (2012) (noting that lack
of international harmonization creates the possibility of regulatory arbitrage)
[hereinafter Weadon, International Regulatory Arbitrage]. For an argument based
on costs, see Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, 47 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 63, 83 (2014) (noting a benefit of regulatory pluralism
for global financial markets is scope of available regulatory actions); Managing
Regulatory Arbitrage: A Conflict of Laws Approach, at 77 – 83 (arguing that that there
are no common global rules for financial regulation to combat financial arbitrage
and even if there were, national governments would not be willing to adopt those
rules).
17 See Larry Keener, Sophia Nicholson-Keener, & Tatiana Koutchma, Harmonization of Legislation and Regulations to Achieve Food Safety: US and Canada Perspective, 94 J. SCI FOOD AGRIC, 1947, 1951-52 (2014) (noting similarities between the
United States’, Food Safety Modernization Act, and Canada’s Safe Food For Canadian’s Act, and noting that nearly half of the foodborne illness outbreaks reported in the United States between 2009-2010 were associated with imported
food, implicating foods imported from areas which previously had not been associated with outbreaks).
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regard to emerging technologies in food production,18 differences
in regulatory approaches, and WTO disputes, both current and
imminent.
New agreements are emerging to provide stronger commitments to IRC in an effort to reduce current and future regulatory
differences.19 In 2012, President Obama issued an Executive Order
prompting U.S. federal agencies to engage in IRC20 by asking them
to identify regulations that are likely to have significant international impact and to consider the regulatory frameworks adopted
by foreign governments in appropriate circumstances.21 Under the
Executive Order, Obama championed two new IRC initiatives or
Mega-Regionals: the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP)—between the United States and the European Union—
and the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a 12-nation pact between
the United States, Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Canada, Chile,
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam.22
Mega-Regionals are deep-integration partnerships between
countries or regions with a major share of world trade and foreign
direct investment, in which two or more of the parties are hubs in
global value chains.23 This new type of agreement, tossed into the
“spaghetti bowl”24 of already existing trade agreements25 is a deSee EU-Meat Products, supra note 12, at 1 (discussing the importation of
meat products treated with hormones and the increased duties on importers).
19 See Haberli, Implications for Swiss Agriculture, supra note 11, at 4 (explaining
that “the most far-reaching objective—and this is where TTIP innovates in respect
of any other RTA—was finding a common road map committing the TTIP Parties
to solve even future regulatory differences.”).
20 Exec. Order No. 13,609, 77 Fed. Reg. 26,413 – 26,415 (May 1, 2012) (E.O.
13,609 is overseen by the Office of Management and Budget and directs agencies
subject to presidential regulatory review to summarize their international regulatory cooperation activities in their Regulatory Plans and to minimize unnecessary
differences between U.S. regulatory requirements and those of key trading partners both in promulgating future rules and in conducting retrospective review of
existing rules).
21 Id.
22 Other Mega-Regionals being negotiated are: Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the 16-member Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership (RCEP) and the 24-member Trade in Services Agreement (TISA).
23 WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, MEGA-REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: GAMECHANGERS OR COSTLY DISTRACTIONS FOR THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM? 8 (July 2014),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_TradeFDI_
MegaRegionalTradeAgreements_Report_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KL5B2GG5].
24 The term was first used by Jagdish Bhagwati in U.S. Trade Policy: The Infat18
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parture from other agreements in that they involve a range of subjects and an ambitious scope, going beyond reductions in tariffs, to
address other trade barriers.
This Article focuses on the TPP, an agreement slated to amass
one third of world trade,26 prioritize regulatory cooperation,27 set
higher standards than those found in other trade agreements,28 and
raise the value of trade among its signatories by 2025.29 This Artiuation with Free Trade Areas. Jagdish Bhagwati, U.S. Trade Policy: The Infatuation
with Free Trade Areas, in Jagdish Bhagwati and Anne O. Krueger, THE DANGEROUS
DRIFT TO PREFERENTIAL TRADE AGREEMENTS, 1 (AEI Press, 1995).
25 See Ricardo Melendez-Ortiz, Mega-regionals: What is going on? in MegaRegional Trade Agreements: Game-Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading System?, WORLD ECON. F. at 13, (July 2014) http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_TradeFDI_MegaRegionalTradeAgreements_
Report_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/9GSA-2N62] (last accessed 10/15/16). Examples are the 160-Member World Trade Organization, 432 Regional Trade
Agreements (238 of which are in force), and 3,196 International Investment
Agreements (IIAs) which include BITS and other IIAs.
26 See IAN FERGUSSEN, MARK MINIMY, & BROCK WILLIAMS, CONGRESSIONAL
RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT 42694, THE TRANS-PACIFIC PARTNERSHIP (TPP)
NEGOTIATIONS AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS at 5 (Mar. 20, 2015),
https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R42694.pdf [https://perma.cc/SL7K-S5CJ]
(“Economically, TPP would bind together a group that represents 40 percent of
global GDP and about a third of world trade”).
27 Trans-Pacific Partnership (released on Nov. 12, 2015), https://ustr.gov/
trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacific-partnership/tpp-full-text
[https://perma.cc/D52Q-JN56]. See also European Union Ambassador Says Eventual
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) Will be Tough to Pass, INSIDE
U.S. TRADE, Oct. 30, 2015 (discussing obstacles to adopting free trade deals). See
EU Ambassador Says Eventual TTIP Deal will be Tough to Pass, Sees CETA as Test
Case, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Oct. 30, 2015, at 1 (explaining EU Ambassador David
O’Sullivan’s statements, that the TTIP, once reached, will face a tougher battle to
passage than previous free trade agreements in the EU because of the false notion
that the TTIP will “force EU governments to give up their authority to regulate”).
28
For some member-nations, standards will be much higher while for others, they will be only slightly higher, varying by industry. This paper argues that
food safety standards will be higher for all TPP members. Contra Dan Stanton,
TPP Five years data protection for Biologics in the US-Asia Trade Deal, (Oct. 5, 2015),
http://www.biopharma-reporter.com/Markets-Regulations/TPP-Five-yearsdata-protection-for-biologics-in-US-Asia-trade-deal
[https://perma.cc/686SUSNS] (discussing the TPP biologics debate. Noting that in the U.S. biologic
pharmaceuticals receive 12 years of patent protection while in some TPP member
nations there is no protection. In the end, the bargained-for number of years of
TPP protection is 5 [not the highest (12), nor the lowest (0)]).
29 See Global Trade Analysis Project, Purdue University, GTAP Resource Report #4118, https://www.gtap.agecon.purdue.edu/resources/res_display.asp?
RecordID=4118 [https://perma.cc/A5Q5-T3L7] (quantifying the economic effects
of the proposed TPP by using the GTAP model with the GTAP v8 2007 database,
updated to 2014). Here, two scenarios were modeled between 2014 and 2025—the
assumed implementation period for the TPP. The “baseline scenario” simulates
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cle explains that, obscured by criticism of the TPP,30 compared to
prior trade agreements, the TPP develops a novel framework that
promises to integrate domestic regulatory oversight and free trade
goals.
Since Mega-Regionals are a new feature to the international
economic system, the current literature fails to account for the role
that these new agreements can play as drivers for regulatory cooperation and food safety. This Article argues that new agreements
carry forward the successes of prior agreements and the ability to
urge cooperation to raise global food safety standards. It extends
my previous work on food safety governance by arguing that
Mega-Regionals have the potential to encourage greater food safety.31 And, it supports the prevailing wisdom in policy debates and
academic literature that problems related to regulatory differences
can be counteracted with measures (such as TPP provisions and
conflict avoidance mechanisms) to harmonize rules across all legal
systems.32
This Article specifically examines how food law concerns can
be incorporated into the current international regulatory regime,
and calls for a new model or regulatory cooperation via MegaRegional trade frameworks along the lines of the TPP. In so doing,
this Article seeks to extend the existing literature on global food
projected growth in GDP and endowments, changes in diets, and the implementation of preferential and unilateral tariff reforms already committed to in the region. A “TPP” scenario adds a hypothetical, full elimination of intra-TPP tariffs
and tariff-rate quotas to the network of trade agreements. Results show that the
U.S. will supply one-third of the expansion in intraregional agricultural exports—
U.S. agricultural exports to TPP partners in 2025 is estimated to be 5% ($2.8 bil.)
higher in 2025 due to the TPP. Japan will account for 70% of growth in intraregional agricultural imports—the value of its agricultural imports from its TPP
partners in 2025 is expected to be 14% ($5.8 bil.) higher than the baseline.
30 See Dan Ciuriak & Harsha Vadhana Singh, Think Piece, Mega-Regionals and
the Regulation of Trade: Implications for Industrial Policy, E15 Expert Group on Reinvigorating Manufacturing: New Industrial Policy and the Trade System Think
Piece, WORLD ECON. F., at 6, 9, (Mar. 10, 2015), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2576887 [https://perma.cc/948F-W9NU] (discussing
how criticisms related to transparency, participation, and regulatory impact, are
assessments that advantage business groups or countries with greater resources).
31 See Alexia Brunet Marks, A New Governance Recipe for Food Safety Regulation,
47 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 3, 907 (2016) [hereinafter Brunet Marks, Recipe for Food Safety]
(comparing food safety protections in the WTO Agreements with those found in
other Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements, and standards found in the private sector. Mega-Regionals are new treaty agreements which provide higher
food safety protections compared to other agreements, short of private standards).
32 See Weadon, International Regulatory Arbitrage, supra note 16 (noting that
lack of international harmonization creates the possibility of regulatory arbitrage).
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safety33 and international regulatory cooperation,34 and contribute
33 See e.g. Ching-Fu Lin, SPS-Plus and Bilateral Treaty Network: A ‘Global’ Solution to the Global Food Safety Problem? 29 WIS. INT'L L.J. 694 (2012) (discussing and
offering recommendations on the role of multilateralism and bilateralism in tackling global food-safety problems); Ching-Fu Lin, Global Food Safety: Exploring Key
Elements for an International Regulatory Strategy, 51 VA. J. INT’L. 637, 637 (2010) (analyzing “the nature of the global food safety crisis against the background of economic globalization and the growing threat of foodborne diseases.”); see also
Stephanie Tai, Food Systems Law from Farm to Fork and Beyond, 45 SETON HALL L.
REV. 109, 110 (2015) (discussing the “systems-oriented” approach to food policy);
Tetty Havinga, Private Regulation of Food Safety by Supermarkets, 28 LAW & POL’Y
515, 515 – 533 (2006) (discussing the case study of a Dutch retailer to show how
market power can be used to force changes in food policy); Elizabeth Trujillo,
Draft, NEW VISIONS FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT, (Monograph),
Cambridge University Press (forthcoming, 2017), copy with author; Alberto Alemanno, The Shaping of European Risk Regulation by Community Courts (Jean Monnet,
Working
Paper
18/08,
2008)
at
2,
http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/08/081801.html
[https://
perma.cc/B5VH-M5B9] (discussing the “main distinctive attributes of the emerging European risk regulatory model.”); Alberto Alemanno, The Multilateral Governance Framework for Food Safety: A Critical and Normative Overview 9-45, in FOOD
SAFETY, MARKET ORGANIZATION, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (Abdelhakim Hammoudi et al. eds., Springer Publishers: New York 2015) (providing a systematic
analysis of the multilateral governance framework for food safety and commenting on areas of fragmentation); Alexia Brunet Marks, The Risks We Are Willing to
Eat: Food Imports and Safety, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 125 (2015) (arguing that the Food
Safety Modernization Act’s efforts to increase food safety will be undercut by the
growing complexity of international trade); Brunet Marks, Governance Recipe for
Food Safety, supra note 31 (discussing the new system of private standards for food
safety and its accompanying short comings).
34 See e.g. Reeve T. Bull, Developing a Domestic Framework for International
Regulatory Cooperation, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 49, 51 (2015) (proposing a
framework for “scrutinizing existing U.S. regulations and eliminating unnecessary international disparities in an effort to encourage regulatory convergence.”)
[hereinafter Bull]; Ching-Wen Hsueh, A Greener Trade Agreement: Approaches to Environmental Issues in the TPP Negotiations 8 ASIAN J. WTO & INT'L HEALTH L & POL'Y
521 (2013) (discussing the environmental impact of TPP adoption and the efficacy
of the enforcement mechanism); C. Boyden Gray, Upgrading Existing Regulatory
Mechanisms for Transatlantic Regulatory Cooperation 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31,
32 (2015) (suggesting means by which progress on “regulatory cooperation under
imperfect political circumstance” can be achieved.”); Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning
Process Toward a Global Policy Laboratory, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 103 (2015)
[https://perma.cc/A33Y-S2GP] (discussing international regulatory cooperation
systems variations and the lessons that can be learned from them); Reeve T. Bull
et al., New Approaches to International Regulatory Cooperation: The Challenge of TTIP,
TPP, and Mega-Regional Trade Agreements, 78 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2015)
[hereinafter Bull et. al. New Approaches] (discussing governance, incentives, and
obstacles facing the growth of international regulatory cooperation); Dunoff, Mapping a Hidden World, supra note 13 (presenting a general survey of international
regulatory cooperation); Terence C. Halliday & Greg Shaffer eds., TRANSNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDERS, 5 (Oxford University Press, 2015) (noting that IRC activity among

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/1

2016]

RIGHT TO REGULATE

13

to the ongoing discussion on the right to regulate.35 It also contributes generally to the academic literatures on global administrative
law36 and the emerging literature on global organizational ecology.37
different institutional organizations); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J.
INT’L L. 1 (2002) (discussing the decline of liberal internationalist organization for
international regulatory cooperation, and the growth of the adaptable and decentralized network model for IRC); Claire R. Kelly, Institutional Alliances and Derivative Legitimacy, 29 MICH. J. INT’L L. 605 (2008) (discussing the means by which institutional organizations gain legitimacy and its effect on member states).
35 This discussion is found within the nascent field comparing international
investment and international trade law. See e.g. Wagner, Regulatory Space, supra
note 2, at 15 (discussing the level of regulatory autonomy possessed by states in
the international investment and international trade regimes); Howard Mann, The
Right of States to Regulation and International Investment Law: A Comment, in THE
DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF FDI: POLICY AND RULEMAKING PERSPECTIVES (United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 2003) at 211 – 225,
http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20034_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFP2-TS3Z]
(arguing that “reshaping of the purpose of investment agreements from protecting foreign investors to creating investment agreements for sustainable development” properly respects a state’s right to regulate); Joel Trachtman, FDI and the
Right to Regulate: Lessons from Trade Law, in THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF FDI:
POLICY AND RULEMAKING PERSPECTIVE (United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development 2003), at 189 – 205, http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20034_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YFP2-TS3Z] (analyzing international trade law interaction
with domestic law, and applying the insights to international investment law); M.
Sornarajan, Right to Regulate and Safeguards, in THE DEVELOPMENT DIMENSION OF
FDI: POLICY AND RULEMAKING PERSPECTIVES, (United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development, 2003), at 205 – 211, http://unctad.org/en/Docs/iteiia20034_
en.pdf [https://perma.cc/YFP2-TS3Z] (analyzing international investment
agreements for the loss of sovereignty and the related exceptions that follow from
joining); Stephan W. Schill, W(h)ither Fragmentation? On the Literature and Sociology
of International Investment Law, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 875, 885 (2011) (summarizing the
existing literature on international investment law and its changing nature).
36 See Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch and Richard B. Stewart, The Emergence
of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2004) (discussing the
shift in focus in literature on international investment law due to changing sociological conditions).
The global administrative law writings usefully address interactions among
international organizations, but do not fully address the regulatory interactions
among regulators.
37 See e.g. Greg Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change: Opportunities and Constraints, LAW AND SOCIETY INQUIRY (2011) (providing an analysis of the
migration of transnational legal norms); Greg Shaffer and Terrence C. Halliday
eds., TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, (2015), (defining transnational legal processes and measuring their effects and limits); Friedrich A. Hayek, THE COUNTERREVOLUTION OF SCIENCE: STUDIES ON THE ABUSE OF REASON (1952) (noting that public
regulation is always one step behind the private market); see also Abraham L.
Newman & David Zaring, Regulatory Networks: Power, Legitimacy and Compliance,
in INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
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The analysis proceeds in four parts, followed by a conclusion.
Part II defines international regulatory cooperation and makes the
case for more regulatory cooperation focusing on food safety and
other factors. Parts III and IV describe the problem and provide
the solution—a conceptual framework for regulatory cooperation
using the TPP as an example. Part V shows how mechanisms
aimed at regulatory cooperation may create externalities. Part VI
concludes.
2. A GROWING DEMAND FOR MORE REGULATORY COOPERATION
The following describes IRC and identifies the need for more
cooperation in global food safety as driven by: (1) the rising threat
of foodborne illness and food safety; (2) different regulatory philosophies creating tension within international trade; (3) regulatory
”collisions” (take for example a WTO dispute) 38, and (4) ‘imminent’
regulatory collisions.
2.1. Defining International Regulatory Cooperation
International Regulatory Cooperation (IRC) originated during
the postwar era and operates today through a framework of international organizations and treaties addressing different fields.
Broadly speaking, IRC involves domestic officials from different
jurisdictions interacting to jointly address issues of mutual concern.39 Examples include the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and, in the economic realm, the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT).40 While there are several academic articles which provide a typology of IRC,41 it embraces harmonization,
RELATIONS: THE STATE OF THE ART at 244 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A. Pollack eds.,
2013) (reviewing scholarship on regulatory networks).
38 See EC-Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products, supra note 12 (providing a Memorandum of Understanding for the importation of beef into the European Community).
39 See Dunoff, Mapping a Hidden World, supra note 13 at 268 (stating that since
the focus is on interactions among domestic regulators, this does not include other
important forms of international regulatory cooperation such as interactions
among actors from different international organizations and private regimes).
40 Id. at 271 – 73 (a historical perspective on the origins of IRC).
41 Id. at 273 – 74 (discussing the typology of IRC aggreements). See also,
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“a process in which diverse elements are combined or adapted to
each other so as to form a coherent whole while retaining their individuality”.42 Professors Jagdish Bhagwati and the late Robert
Hudec wrote extensively on the general characteristics of harmonization as a way to pool regulators’ resources in developing standards for public health protection, reducing industry compliance
costs in the global market, and minimizing impediments to bringing safe food to consumers.43 The following discussion provides
examples of countries cooperating in ways that harmonize regulatory differences, focusing on food safety.
Countries engage in IRC through several techniques along a
continuum, from fully uncoordinated regulatory heterogeneity to
fully uniform regulatory homogeneity (convergence).44 Cooperative regulation can involve a country engaging in any of a number
of techniques to reduce regulatory differences.45 The vehicle for
using the technique can be a free trade agreement, international
agreement, a standard-setting organization in a specific area, bilateral cooperation among domestic regulators, an international organization, or a Mega-Regional.46 While countries adopt IRC techniques to achieve certain objectives, I focus on achieving higher
levels of food safety. The techniques described below are useful
for mapping the prevailing food safety goals and for illustrating
how Mega-Regionals expand IRC.
Moving from fully uncoordinated regulatory heterogeneity,
countries initiate regulatory cooperation through dialogue and
procedural soft law, informally exchanging information to foster
mutual understanding and cooperation. Examples of these nonKauffmann & Malyshev, International Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 13 at 1 – 3
(providing a typology of the continuum of IRC agreements).
42 Martin Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 699,
702 (1991).
43 See generally FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE
TRADE? (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) (multiple authors discussing harmonization and divergence in the context of labor, immigration, and
environmental regulations). See also U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., About FDA: Overview,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/CentersOffices/
OfficeofGlobalRegulatoryOperationsandPolicy/OfficeofInternationalPrograms/ucm236581.htm) [https://perma.cc/4TWGWKFN] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (stating that the FDA engages in several forms
of regulatory harmonization).
44 See Bull et. al. New Approaches, supra note 34 (summarizing and analyzing
the eleven types of IRC mechanisms provided in two OECD papers).
45 Id. at 8.
46 Id. at 8 – 10.
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legally binding instruments include OECD guidelines47 and principles, and Global Salmserv, an international organization of laboratories and individuals involved in amplifying Salmonella prevention
which, in 2009, changed its name to the Global Foodborne Infections
Network to better reflect the scope beyond Salmonella.48
Standard-setting is the next step along the continuum and it
begins with the adoption of private codes (technical standards49)
by multinational private standards organizations. Examples of
private codes are GFSI50 and GlobalG.A.P.51 Countries participate
in international standard setting by relying on private codes or
through membership in international organizations.52 Despite the
criticism of the use of international standards,53 standards are im47 See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/
[https://perma.cc/E7PG-94RW] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (providing links to
different OECD guidelines).
48 See WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, The Global Foodborne Infectious Network
Key Activities, http://www.who.int/gfn/activities/en/ [https://perma.cc/928F6735] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (describing the major activities of the Global
Foodborne Infections Network) [hereinafter WHO, Global Foodborne Network].
49 See ALAN O. SYKES, PRODUCT STANDARDS FOR INTERNATIONALLY INTEGRATED
GOODS MARKETS at 2 (1995) (defining a product standard as “a specification or set
of specifications that relates to some characteristic of a product or its manufacture.”).
50 See
GLOBAL
FOOD
SAFETY
INITIATIVE,
What
is
GFSI,
http://www.mygfsi.com/about-us/about-gfsi/what-is-gfsi.html
[https://perma.cc/9UEJ-ZVUU] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (describing the Global
Food Safety Initiative’s mission, objectives, and background).
51 See GLOBALG.A.P, GLOBALG.A.P. - Putting Food Safety and Sustainability on
the
Map,
http://www.mygfsi.com/about-us/about-gfsi/what-is-gfsi.html
[https://perma.cc/7PBZ-T6DT] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (providing information about G.A.P and GlobalG.A.P.).
52 See Eibe Riedel, Standards and Sources: Farewell to the Exclusivity of the
Sources Triad in International Law? 2 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 58, 81 – 82 (1991) (showing
that organizations set standards to harmonize transactions in fields such as environmental law and human rights).
53 See Alberto Alemanno & Giuseppe Capodieci, Testing the Limits of Global
Food Governance: The Case of Ractopamine, 3 EUR. J. RISK REG. 400 (2012) (arguing
that the use of the drug ractopamine will lead to trade disputes and the weakening of multilateral global food safety governance). See also Kuei-Jung Ni, Does Science Speak Clearly and Fairly in Trade and Food Safety Disputes? The Search for an Optimal Response to WTO Adjudication to Problematic International Standard-Making, 68
FOOD & DRUG L. J. 97, 97 (2013) (stating that Codex standard setting may be unduly influenced by trade interests); Alberto Alemanno, TRADE IN FOOD: REGULATORY
AND JUDICIAL APPROACHES IN THE EU AND THE WTO 262 – 3 (2007) (“WTO members
have incentives to make sure that the new standards of Codex, IPPC and OIE find
inspiration in their current or future national SPS measures,” meaning that policy
positions on standards are motivated by self-interest). Also, Codex is incentivized

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/1

2016]

RIGHT TO REGULATE

17

portant in food safety. For example, standards specify limits for
pesticide residue levels on the skin of an apple, or for example,
“methods for laboratory testing of beef or milk for artificial growth
hormones (or natural components, such as fat content) so that food
safety inspections and consumer labels provide reliable and comparable information.”54 Standards are also important because,
when used to justify a trade measure, the WTO General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade raises a presumption that such measures are
legitimate and not protectionist.55 An example of incorporation of
private codes into national legislative instruments can be found in
the United States Food Safety Modernization Act requirement that
exporters conducting business with United States importers receive external audits from private entities.56 Another technique for
fostering IRC along the continuum is transgovernmental networking, known as cooperation among agencies or national governments based on frequent interaction without formal treaties. The
Global Foodborne Infections Network serves as an example.57
Formal international agreements are next along the continuum
and are a typical avenue for fostering IRC. Mutual Recognition
Agreements are treaties in which countries retain different national
standards in national regulatory law, but agree to allow market access upon approval by the other jurisdiction’s regulatory authority.
Bilateral agreements for mutual recognition of national regulatory
standards or conformity procedures and other forms of regulatory
by the enforceability of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism in such a way
that Codex member states tend to vote in a manner what would advance their
trade interests rather than promote food safety. A country that has its standards
adopted in the Codex will not have to defend its SPS measures in the WTO. Such
a presumption may tempt countries to make frequent use of majority voting at
Codex meetings.
54 See Tim Büthe & Walter Mattli, International Standards and Standard-Setting
Bodies, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF BUSINESS AND GOVERNMENT 440, 440 (David
Coen et. al. eds., 2010) (stating the importance of food safety standards).
55 See WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, art. 3, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 [hereinafter SPS Agreement] (establishing
standards for food safety and sanitary measures for plants and animals); Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 2.4, 1868 U.N.T.S. 120 (establishing
standards for regulation in order reduce barriers to trade).
56 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FSMA Final Rule on Accredited Third-Party
Certification,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/
ucm361903.htm [https://perma.cc/GF2D-QNX3] (summarizing the rule on accreditation for third-party certification bodies for food safety).
57 See WHO, Global Foodborne Network, supra note 48 (describing the Global
Foodborne Infections Network).
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coordination are called regulatory equivalence determinations.58
These types of agreements are common for certain foods. Using
poultry imports as an example, an import may proceed only if the
country willing to export proves that its inspection system, guaranteeing the safety of final products, is equivalent to that of the United States with verification of the applicant’s inspection system performed by the United States Department of Agriculture.59
Next, international agreements are multilateral treaties that aim
to reduce regulatory barriers to trade. The WTO is an example of
an international organization that makes countries transpose international trade obligations into domestic law through a multilateral
treaty.60 The United States, for example, has free trade agreements
in place with twenty nations,61 and other agreements which seek to
harmonize economic relations. A Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU), also known as a “Cooperative Arrangement,”62 is a formal
agreement between the FDA and one or more foreign governments
or international partners that describes the willingness and goodfaith intentions of FDA and its counterpart(s) to engage in coopera-

58 See Kalypso Nicolaidis & Gregory Shaffer, Transnational Mutual Recognition
Regimes: Governance without Global Government, 68 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 263,
264 (2005) [https://perma.cc/8JBG-93NV] (“Mutual recognition forms an essential part of any global administrative law”). For recent case law on equivalence,
see WTO, Standards Committee Discusses Tyres, Toy Safety and Food,
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/tbt_10nov15_e.htm [https://
perma.cc/SX2J-HALF] (noting that “’equivalence’ refers to governments recognizing other countries’ measures as acceptable even if they are different from their
own, so long as an equivalent level of protection is provided.”).
59 See Panel Report, United States-Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry
from China, ¶2.6, WTO Doc. WT/DS392/R (adopted Sept. 29, 2010),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/392r_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/
V5ST-TP6E] (The FSIS, an agency of the USDA, will determine permissibility of
importation based on “whether an applicant’s poultry inspection system is equivalent to that of the United States”).
60 See JARROD WIENER, GLOBALIZATION AND THE HARMONIZATION OF LAW 35
(1999) (noting that harmonization of regulation across borders sometimes occurs
through adopting international agreements into domestic law).
61 See OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, Free Trade Agreements, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements (last accessed
Sept. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6EPR-G2EC] (listing free trade agreements with
Australia, Bahrain, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Korea, Mexico, Morocco, Nicaragua, Oman, Panama, Peru, and Singapore).
62 U.S.
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., FDA Memoranda of Understanding,
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/MemorandaofUn
derstandingMOUs/default.htm [https://perma.cc/TP9Y-P568].
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tive activities.63 The FDA enters into MOUs with other entities
whenever there is a need to delineate authority or responsibility, or
to explain cooperative procedures. A Confidentiality Commitment
is a precursor to the Cooperative Arrangement and it allows but
does not require countries to share non-public information between governments.64
Other agreements enable countries to share resources critical
for food safety. The current structure for international/regional
foodborne disease surveillance, for example, includes both formal
and informal relationships between and among countries. Some
examples include the Global Foodborne Infections Network and the
European Commission Health and Consumer Protection weekly
reports from the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF).65
Regulatory agencies in the United States work closely with other
countries to assist in developing the U.S. Foodborne Illness Surveillance System (FoodNet) in other countries (such as OZFoodNet in
Australia).66 Formal (or informal) coordination with the World
Health Organization (WHO) and the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations and other international and
regional organizations regarding incidents involving intentional
contamination is an integral part of strengthening national systems
to respond to all food safety emergencies, including country participation in the INFOSAN Emergency Network.67
Finally, as countries move towards a single regulatory law,
countries can promote regulatory cooperation by joining international organizations, such as the Codex Alimetarius Commission
Id.
A ‘Confidentiality Commitment’ is a document that must be in place for
the FDA to share certain non-public information with FDA counterparts in foreign
countries and international organizations as part of cooperative law enforcement
or regulatory activities.
65 See FOOD AND AGRIC. ORG., Food Contamination Monitoring and Food-Borne
Disease Surveillance at National Level, http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/
008/y5871e/y5871e0n.htm [https://perma.cc/F9DU-V8QG] (last visited Sept. 21,
2016) (recommending the establishment of a coordinating body in order to monitor food contamination and conduct foodborne disease surveillance) [hereinafter
FAO, International Cooperation].
66 The U.S. agencies which are responsible for forming partnerships with other country regulators include: the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' (HHS) Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (HHS/CDC), the U.S.
Department of Agriculture's (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), as
well as the HHS' Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
67 See FAO, International Cooperation, supra note 65 (describing the objectives
of the INFOSAN).
63
64
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(Codex), the international food standard-setting organization, and
entering into formal regulatory partnerships, such as the USCanada Regulatory Cooperation Council.68 From there, countries
can further harmonize through a supranational or joint regulator
or through a formal agreement to adopt the same regulatory
standard in each national regulation. An example of this is the
United States Food Safety Modernization Act as applied to the
United Sates, or European Union Directives as applied to European
Union-Member nations. The final step before full cooperation is to
enlist a joint regulator, or a single regulatory agency to promulgate
joint regulations with standards covering two or more jurisdictions. An example of this is the Joint Food Standards Australia and
New Zealand.69
Among these techniques for food safety, international agreements, mutual recognition agreements, and membership in international organizations are most popular, with the proliferation of
private codes and joint regulation gaining momentum. And yet,
when harmonization of product standards is neither feasible nor
economically viable for some,70 or when strong preferences of national standards preclude harmonization, recognition of equivalence is an alternative to a specific area, time, degree and scope.71
In this way, harmonization must be viewed in light of other complementary alternatives discussed below, such as: standard-setting,
transparency and monitoring, technical assistance, recognition and
equivalence, economic integration, convergence of policy proce68 For a description of the US-Canada Regulatory Cooperation Council, see
UNITED STATES – CANADA REGULATORY COOPERATION COUNCIL, JOINT FORWARD
PLAN,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/oira/irc/uscanada-rcc-joint-forward-plan.pdf (2014) [https://perma.cc/5ZS2-U74L] (last visited Sept. 21, 2016) (describing various initiatives to improve regulatory cooperation).
69 Id.
70 See Dunoff, Mapping a Hidden World, supra note 13 at 150 (noting that a
complementary approach to harmonization is recognition of equivalence, given
the substantial challenge that harmonization may be).
71 See William A. Kerr & James D. Gaisford, HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL
TRADE POLICY (2007), at 400; David W. Leebron, Lying Down with Procrustes: An
Analysis of Harmonization Claims, in FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION:
PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 41, 91 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec, eds.,
1996) (arguing that “mutual recognition achieves most of the benefits of harmonization with few of its costs”). See also TIM E. JOSLING, ET AL., FOOD REGULATION AND
TRADE: TOWARD A SAFE AND OPEN GLOBAL SYSTEM 194 (Institute for International
Economics 2004) (noting that “equivalence is an alternate to harmonization” that
has some pros and cons).
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dures, or regulatory mechanisms within international legal regimes. 72
2.2. Food Safety Threats and Challenges
Regulators are keenly aware of the various risks related to food
imports that result from mislabeling, undeclared allergens, the use
of banned additives, and food contamination.73 But as advances in
food science and food production become more technologically
complex, and as supply chains continue to grow, regulators need
to minimize food safety risks74 related to new technologies and
new country sources.
A wide range of new technologies is emerging to meet various
food production needs. Some technologies make food resistant to
disease, grow faster and more efficiently, produce less waste, or
help produce novel products that benefit humans. Others make
food more attractive (e.g. titanium dioxide in the case of Gobstoppers) or increase food safety.75 For example, the processing method
of bathing poultry in antimicrobial baths (“pathogen reduction
treatments”) commonly uses chlorine and lactic acid to reduce risk
of Salmonella. While chlorine baths are now common in the United States (and 120 countries) as a food safety measure to kill bacte72 See CHRISTIAN STRUCK, PRODUCT REGULATIONS AND STANDARDS IN WTO LAW
163 (2014); Dunoff, Mapping a Hidden World supra note 13 at 273 (arguing that
global regulators lack many regulatory mechanisms that are common features of
domestic regulators). See also David W. Leebron, Mutual Recognition: Structure,
Problems and Prospects, in REGULATORY REFORM AND INTERNATIONAL MARKET
OPENNESS 205, 213 (1996) (noting that harmonization, standardization and recognition of equivalence serve complementary functions).
73 See Brunet Marks, The Risks, supra note 33 (referring to the import refusal
dataset).
74 For a list of risks, see FAO, International Cooperation, supra note 65 (listing
risks such as soil degradation). And, to be sure, the examples of nanofoods and
genetically modified foods are stand-ins for a number food-related issues, technologies currently being tested and considered, such as growth hormones, food
products from cloned animals, endocrine disrupting chemicals, antimicrobial resistance to antibiotics, plant synthetic biology, and future food risks that public
health and safety regulation may address.
75 See Joanna Klein, Dolly the Sheep’s Fellow Clones, Enjoying Their Golden Years,
N.Y. TIMES, Jul. 26, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/27/science/dollythe-sheep-clones.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&clickSource=storyheading&module=second-column-region&region=top-news&WT.nav=topnews&_r=0 [https://perma.cc/QB43-5R8H] (noting that the European Union
bans the sale and import of food from cloned animals).
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ria, Europe has banned them since 1990 as a possible cancer risk
(though Europe allows meat bathed in lactic acid).76
As regulators try to develop an acceptable risk management
strategy with respect to new technologies, IRC techniques provide
regulators with a range of options. International food standards,
drafted by the Codex Commission, are frequently used to guide
regulation. In 2011, Codex established a standard for washing
meat using chlorine or lactic acid.77 This new standard pressured
the European Food Safety Association to consider adopting lactic
acid as a washing agent. The European approach (using lactic acid) will not be identical to the approach in the United States (using
chlorine), but the regulations will be equivalent in that they accomplish the same end result. Here, an equivalence determination
was the IRC technique used to resolve this regulatory difference.
What happens in cases such as nanotechnology, where standards
do not exist? In this situation, different IRC techniques, starting
with dialogue, can be used to encourage cooperation, and some
agreements can foster IRC better than others.
With new supply chains, often in new geographical areas, it
can be particularly difficult to verify that new suppliers can provide the requisite regulatory framework and sufficiently robust
public health measures to ensure the safety of the foods offered for
international trade.78 Some food risks do not involve new technologies but can be traced to longstanding food safety problems, such
as fish trade with Asia.
Every year, consumers in the United States purchase two trillion dollars’ worth of imported products from 825,000 importers
76 See Susanna Capelouto, European Activists Say They Don’t Want Any U.S.
‘Chlorine Chicken’, NPR, Sept. 30, 2014 http://www.npr.org/sections/
thesalt/2014/09/30/351774240/european-activists-say-they-dont-want-any-u-schlorine-chicken [https://perma.cc/3DTX-CCGX] (mentioning the ban upon
chlorine treated chicken). See also Laurence Peter, TTIP Talks: Food Fights Block EUUS Trade Deal, BBC NEWS, June 10, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-33055665 [https://perma.cc/9845-Q3E7] (describing that the EFSA is considering whether to allow peroxyacetic acid as a poultry rinse).
77 See CODEX ALIMENTARIUS COMMISSION, Report of the Forty-Second Session of
the Codex Committee on Food Hygiene, Appendix 3, ¶77, U.N. Doc. REP 11/FH,
http://www.ift.org/public-policy-and-regulations/advocacy/~/media/Public%
20Policy/International%20Advocacy/Codex_CCFH.pdf [https://perma.cc/SSJ3ZE34] (stipulating the guidelines for washing carcasses to prevent salmonella and
campylobacter in chicken meat).
78 See generally Brunet Marks, The Risks, supra note 33 (discussing the challenges and shortcomings facing the Food Safety Modernization Act of 2011, which
updates regulatory means for fighting food safety risks).
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through more than 300 ports of entry. These numbers are rising79
making food safety breaches inevitable. The United States imports
80% of its fish supply, largely from developing countries in Asia.
United States Center for Disease Control (CDC) experts reviewed
outbreaks from 2005-2010 for foods imported to the United States
and found that during those years, 39 outbreaks and 2348 illnesses
were linked to food imports from 15 countries.80 Nearly half (17
outbreaks) occurred in 2009 and 2010 with 45% of the imported
foods causing the outbreaks coming from Asia.81 Fish (17 outbreaks) were the most common source of implicated imported
foodborne disease, followed by spices (6 outbreaks).82 These
longstanding food safety problems motivate regulators in different
countries to work together to harmonize standards and regulatory
requirements.
For instance, for some time, United States consumers have
complained about lax food safety standards in Vietnam and Malaysia over catfish exports with traces of antibiotics. As complaints
heightened during the TPP negotiations83 the catfish inspections
shifted to the USDA from the FDA.84 In the United States, food is
79 See Press Release, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
(HHS), HHS Preparing to Open FDA Offices in China, India, Europe and Latin
America This Year (Oct. 16, 2008), http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/
Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm153679.htm
[https://perma.cc/976PELW7] (announcing the opening of several international FDA offices).
80 See Press Release, US CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, CDC
Research Shows Outbreak Linked to Imported Foods Increasing (Mar. 14, 2012),
https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2012/p0314_foodborne.html
[https://
perma.cc/LZ8E-F3ZC] (stating that the increase in outbreaks is related to increased food imports).
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 See Dan Flynn, House Leaders Asked Not to Vote on Senate Resolution to End
USDA Catfish Inspection, FOOD SAFETY NEWS, (May 31, 2016), http://
www.foodsafetynews.com/2016/05/house-might-not-vote-on-senate-maneuverto-end-usda-catfish-inspection/#.V42eSKJbjsA [https://perma.cc/VM5H-FWT4]
(noting that United States Farm Bills going back to 2008 require catfish inspections). See also Letter from Rosa L. DeLauro, supra note 1 (exemplifying complaints as the TPP was being drafted).
84 Dan Flynn, USDA Plans to Begin Catfish Inspections in March 2016, FOOD
SAFETY NEWS, (Nov. 26, 2015), http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/11/usdasdomestic-and-foreign-catfish-inspections-will-begin-in-march-2016/
#.Vq47Y0ZRoio [https://perma.cc/2SU2-YBB6] (stating that the USDA released
a final rule shifting catfish inspections to the Agency from the FDA, under a special program beginning in March, 2016, which will include equivalency determinations and audits). See also Press Release, US DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE,
USDA Releases Final Rule Establishing Inspection Programs for Siluriformes Fish,
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mostly regulated by three agencies: the FDA, USDA and the Environmental Protection Agency. There are problems that come with
regulating in tandem,85 but also advantages– such as being able to
fix food safety problems by shifting agency oversight. Compared
to the FDA, the USDA has more strict enforcement.86 While catfish
inspection under the USDA may improve, agency shifts are not a
long-term sustainable solution.87 This example shows that regulatory differences in enforcement of domestic food safety regulations
(or lack thereof) can motivate more regulatory cooperation (from
less stringent FDA oversight to more stringent USDA oversight).
The following section shows how varying regulatory approaches,
based on differences in philosophy and culture, motivate greater
IRC.
2.3. Competing Philosophical Approaches to Regulation
Countries have the right to enact regulations to protect public
health and safety and they do so, based on different perceptions of
what constitutes a risk. As Trebilcock and Soloway point out, “one
nation’s bunch of grapes is another nation’s repository of carcinogenic pesticide residue.”88 Regulatory differences can emerge from
differences in constitutional and political structures,89 regulatory
Including Catfish (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/
fsis/newsroom/news-releases-statements-transcripts/news-release-archives-byyear/archive/2015/nr-112515-01 [https://perma.cc/YB5M-R6N9] (providing the
final Catfish inspection rule).
85 See Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33
UCLA L. REV. 665, 701 (1986) (noting the friction in foreign relations that results
from conflicting national regulation) [hereinafter Trimble].
86 Border inspections will improve once the FDA Food Safety Modernization
Act and the new import safety rules are implemented, but for the time being, low
rates of FDA border inspections will continue to compromise the safety of food
entering the United States.
87 Additionally, the TPP rules do not necessitate the enforcement of domestic
rules. There is no enforcement mechanism for domestic inspections.
88 See Michael Trebilcock & Julie Soloway, International. Policy and Domestic
Food Safety Regulation: The Case for Substantial Deference by the WTO Settlement Body
under the SPS Agreement, in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE at 1
(Daniel L. Kennedy & James D. Southwick eds., 2002).
89 See Richard Parker & Alberto Alemanno, Towards Effective Regulatory Cooperation under TTIP: A Comparative Overview of the EU and US Legislative and Regulatory Systems, EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2014) http://trade.ec.europa.eu/
doclib/docs/2014/may/tradoc_152466.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WT8P-UYUX]
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divergences, disparate risk assessments and tolerances, political
considerations,90 historical values, and cultural norms.91 Regulatory differences can also develop when harmonization presents remarkable practical and political challenges.92
Two regulatory paradigms have come to dominate international debates and disputes over health and environmental risk –
one based on ‘sound science’, or the ‘reasonable certainty of no
harm’ standard, and one based on the ‘precautionary principle’.93
While both regulatory approaches are science-based in that scientific evidence is the point for assessments of risk, they diverge on
the way scientific evidence is evaluated given different sensitivities
to uncertainties and levels of emphasis placed on social and economic matters.94
The United States’ notion of ‘sound science’ emphasizes that
protective actions should be used only when there is sound scientific evidence of risk.95 Evidence is limited to that ‘gathered
through scientific methods’ with the result that only ‘a complete,
self-contained, scientific evaluation’ will be considered an adequate risk assessment.96 Meanwhile, the ‘precautionary principle’,
(showing that U.S., regulatory programs are relatively highly centralized in the
federal government with administrative agencies playing a major role in decision
making; while in Europe, regulatory authority is shared between the EU and
member states).
90 See Bull, supra note 34 (offering a detailed view of the four causes of regulatory differences).
91 See
DANIEL W. DREZNER, ALL POLITICS IS GLOBAL: EXPLAINING
INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY REGIMES at 162 – 64 (2007) (explaining why the European Union agreed to the SPS).
92 See Ravichandran, supra note 5, at 77 – 83 (providing an example of how
the precautionary principle may take too long compared to equivalence, but
equivalence is more politically feasible).
93 World HEALTH ORGANIZATION, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: PROTECTING
PUBLIC HEALTH, THE ENVIRONMENT AND THE FUTURE OF OUR CHILDREN at 94 (Marco
Martuzzi and Joel A. Tickner, eds. 2004) [hereinafter WHO, THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE].
94 Id. at 169.
95 See Mills v. Grant of Md. L.L.C., 441 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D.C. 2006) (aff’d 508
F.3d 11 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (citing 21 C.F.R. 170 (3i)) (“the FDA has defined ‘safety’ to
mean that there is a reasonable certainty in the minds of competent scientists that
the substance is not harmful under the intended conditions of use”).
96 See Panel Report, Japan-Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, 8.92,
WTO Doc. WT/SD245/R (adopted July 15, 2003), https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds245_e.htm [https://perma.cc/SZ97-5RXH] (providing an example in Japan’s restrictions on American apple exports). See also Panel
Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, 7/3188. WTO Doc. WT/DS/291/R; WT/DS292/R; WT/DS293/R,
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articulated in the 1960s, and widely adopted today, generally advocates for regulating when faced with scientific uncertainty about
risk to human health and the environment.97 This principle
acknowledges that scientific understanding is limited and precautionary action can serve underlying values based on what is known
as well as what is not known.98 It encourages close scrutiny of all
aspects of science, from the research agenda to the funding, design,
interpretation and limits of studies, and involves recognizing that
the answer science gives to questions of safety and risk typically
depends on the specific question asked, how it is framed, and the
underlying assumptions.99 In practice then, the question becomes
whether there is flexibility, where issues of scientific uncertainty
arise, to embrace broader forms of risk assessment that blend scientific findings, anecdotal information, and value concerns.100 Ultimately, a food producer has to demonstrate that a food product is
safe: when there are credible threats of harm, precautionary action
should be taken, even absent full understanding of the effects of a
proposed activity.
While the precautionary principle has application in other
countries,101 the European Union102 has become a strong proponent
(adopted Sept. 29, 2006), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/
cases_e/ds291_e.htm [https://perma.cc/VJ5V-TM6Y] (resolving a dispute over
biotechnology products imported into the EC from the United States).
97 See WHO, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 93, at 7 (“in cases of
serious or irreversible threats to the health of humans or ecosystems, acknowledged scientific uncertainty should not be used as a reason to postpone preventive measures”).
98 Id. (noting that the precautionary principle carries its own values. The
principle is based on recognizing that people have a responsibility to prevent
harm and to preserve the natural foundations of life, now and into the future. The
needs of future generations of people and other species and the integrity of ecosystems are recognized as being worthy of care and respect. A precautionary approach asks how much harm can be avoided rather than asking how much is acceptable. It acknowledges that the world comprises complex, interrelated systems
that are vulnerable to harm from human activities and resistant to full understanding. Precaution gives priority to protecting these vulnerable systems and
requires gratitude, empathy, restraint, humility, respect, and compassion).
99 Id. at 194.
100 Id.
101 The precautionary principle is said to originate in Germany, however,
other countries including the U.S. also have a long history of reliance on precautionary approaches to regulation. The United States led with precautionary environmental policies in the 1960’s, 70’s and 80’s. By the 1990s, the roles had reversed, and it was the U.S. government that resisted precautionary-based controls
in areas such as climate change, whereas the EU surged ahead. See Jonathan B.
Weiner, Whose Precaution After All? A Comment on the Comparison and Evolution of
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of precautionary regulation in a range of health and environmental
areas.103 Beginning with regulatory failures and ‘crises’ that took
place in Europe in the late 1980s (concerning nuclear and chemical
accidents) and the latter half of the 1990s (involving food safety
and health protection – most prominent of which was mad cow
disease, which severely undermined public trust in European Union food safety regulations and the scientific expertise on which
they were based),104 European regulatory policies began to embrace a more stringent approach compared to American regulatory
policies.105 In the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the European Union
expressly provided that the European Union policy on the environment “shall be based on the precautionary principle”.106 Despite its environmental origins in the European Community Treaty, the precautionary principle has shown that it has application in
Risk Regulatory Systems, 13 DUKE J. COMP. INT’L. L. 207 (2003) (comparing US and
EU regulations generally). See also WHO, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra
note 93, at 42 (providing an in-depth discussion of the principle).
102 Alberto Alemanno, The Shaping of European Risk Regulation by Community
Courts
(Jean
Monnet
Working
Paper
18/08,
2008),
http://
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/08/081801.html [https://perma.cc/U5E4WCBF].
103 Most notably in climate change, biotechnology, and chemicals regulation.
By contrast, it was the USA throughout the 1970s and 1980s that pushed most
strongly for precautionary international environmental agreements for endangered species protection and the regulation of ozone-depleting substances.
104 See Wiener & Alemanno, supra note 34, at 169 (noting the discussion on
delegation of authority to regulatory agencies). See also David Vogel, The Politics
of Risk Regulation in Europe and the United States, in 3 THE YEARBOOK OF EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1, 2 – 3, 24 – 34 (H. Somsen et al. eds., 2003) (cataloguing
various regulatory failures over the course of the 1980s and 1990s in Europe);
Wiener, infra 106, at 227 (indicating nations that generally take a more ‘precautionary’ approach than the U.S. in the nuclear power area, because the U.S. experienced the Three Mile Island disaster, while the EU did not have any equivalent
meltdown in the EU).
105 David Vogel, The Hare and the Tortoise Revisited: The New Politics of Consumer and Environmental Regulation in Europe, 33 BRITISH J. POL. SCI. 557, 571 – 73 (2003).
106 Jonathan B. Wiener, The Rhetoric of Precaution, in THE REALITY OF
PRECAUTION: COMPARING RISK REGULATION IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE,
(Jonathan B. Wiener et al. eds., 2011) (noting that the Treaty on European Union,
Official Journal C 191, 29 July 1992 entered into force 1 Nov. 1993. This treaty
changed the name of the former European Economic Community to simply the
‘European Community’ and added new provisions to the Community’s constitutive treaty document. The new provisions included Article 130r concerning the
role of the precautionary principle in Community environmental policy). See also,
Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaties
Establishing the European Communities and Related Acts, 1997, O.J. (C 340) (entered into force May 1, 1999) (enacting the precautionary principle in Article
174(2) of the EC Treaty).
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other areas, for instance, to protect human health and plant
health.107
Philosophical differences can become a source of contention
when national regulatory approaches come into conflict at the international level.108 In the late 1990s, precaution began to emerge
as the focus of dispute between the European Union, the United
States, and other large trading blocs.109 Two examples illustrate
how these two paradigms differ with respect to regulating new
food technologies (and where cooperation is needed).
The first example uses Gobstoppers to compare how the European Union and the United States regulate nanotechnology. As noted earlier, Gobstoppers contain titanium dioxide, a nanoparticle and
food additive, used to brighten color. The European Union requires labeling ingredients derived from nanotechnology110, while
the United States does not. In the United States, the FDA regulates
food products and not food technologies so no special regulations
exist for the use or labeling of nanotechnology in the food industry.111 As a food additive, titanium dioxide requires FDA approval
through a petition process that assures that the additive is safe for
its intended use.112 To date, food ingredients and food products
Id. at 52 (citing the European Commission communication on precaution).
See Trimble supra note 85. There are other problems as countries treat nations as working under one regulatory entity when this is not often the case.
Trimble notes the friction in foreign relations that results from conflicting national
regulation – which is the case for food safety as it is regulated by several federal
agencies.
109 See WHO, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 93, at 51 (noting that
in the 1990s, the EU cited the precautionary principle to justify trade restrictions
on the import of United States beef treated with hormones and of genetically
modified food material, reasoning that the science was not sufficiently robust.
The U.S., meanwhile, claimed that the principle was an unjustified trade barrier).
110 See Exec. Order No. 13,609, supra note 20 (noting that the European Union
has recommended special regulations that have yet to be accepted and enforced.
Also noting that the Royal Society and the Royal Academy of Engineering recommend indicating nanoparticles in the lists of ingredients).
111 See Nanotechnology, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION (last updated Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/ScienceResearch/SpecialTopics/
Nanotechnology/default.htm [https://perma.cc/MXW9-Y9LQ] (noting that the
FDA says that it regulates “products, not technologies.” In the United States, the
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires manufacturers to demonstrate
that the food ingredients and food products are not harmful to health, yet this
regulation does not “specifically” cover nanoparticles, which could become harmful only in nano-sized applications. Thus no special regulations exist for the use
of nanotechnology in the food industry).
112 See Guidance for Industry: Questions and Answers about the Petition Process,
U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION (last updated July 1, 2016),
107
108
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are not harmful to health113 yet the approval of titanium dioxide as
an additive did not specifically cover nanoparticle properties or
potential risks.
Another example uses AquAdvantage Salmon,114 a genetically
modified salmon developed in the United States, to compare how
the European Union and the United States regulate genetically
modified food. The United States ‘sound science’ approach requires the FDA to show that the genetically modified food is as
safe as its non-genetically modified counterpart.115 In 2016, the
FDA determined that food from AquAdvantage Salmon is as safe to
eat as food from non-genetically modified Atlantic salmon and,
since there is no “material difference” between the genetically
modified Atlantic salmon and the non-genetically modified Atlantic salmon, there is no obligation to label the product as genetically
modified (although the FDA will issue guidance to companies on
how to label products voluntarily).116 Yet, despite FDA approval,
http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/GuidanceDocuments
RegulatoryInformation/IngredientsAdditivesGRASPackaging/ucm253328.htm
[https://perma.cc/THK5-K6AH] (providing guidance on the petition process related to food additives).
113 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, Summary of Color Additives for Use
in the United States in Foods, Drugs, Cosmetics, and Medical Devices (last updated
Nov.
30,
2015),
http://www.fda.gov/ForIndustry/ColorAdditives/
ColorAdditiveInventories/ucm115641.htm [https://perma.cc/ERM8-2HTB] (listing food additives).
114 Andrew Pollack, Genetically Engineered Salmon Approved for Consumption,
N.Y. TIMES, (Nov. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/20/business/
genetically-engineered-salmon-approved-for-consumption.html
[https://
perma.cc/7ZGH-2NDU] (noting that an Atlantic salmon contains a growth hormone gene from a Chinook salmon and a fragment of ocean pout DNA that acts
as a sort of perpetual “on” switch—a combination that helps the salmon grow
large enough for consumption in 18 months instead of the typical three years).
115 As part of its evaluation, the FDA examined data comparing three groups
of fish: non-GE farm-raised Atlantic salmon from both the sponsor’s farm and
from a different commercial farm, and AquAdvantage Salmon. This study compared key hormones (including estradiol, testosterone, 11-ketotestosterone, T3, T4
and insulin-like growth factor 1) and found no biologically relevant differences.
See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, AquAdvantage Salmon Fact Sheet (last updated Dec. 21, 2015), http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/Development
ApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEngineeredAnimals/
ucm473238.htm [https://perma.cc/7ZGH-2NDU] (summarizing features of
AquAdvantage Salmon).
116 See U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMINISTRATION, AquAdantage Salmon (last updated
on
Apr.
7,
2016),
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEngineered
Animals/ucm280853.htm [https://perma.cc/72RE-ZPHN] (listing documents related to the AquAdvantage Salmon approval).
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within the United States, certain states and counties have passed
bills which require labeling for foods containing genetically modified organisms.117
The precautionary principle is now most prominent in European Union law relating to food safety (as seen in the regulation of
genetically modified organisms or ‘GMOs’).118 The European Union approach requires genetically modified food to undergo a strict
approval process for import or sale– so strict that only one genetically modified crop has been approved to date.119 Genetically
modified crops require pre-approval prior to their release , as per
the 2001 European Union GMO Directive on the deliberate release
into the environment of genetically modified organisms, one of the
few European Union environmental risk instruments to be explicitly based on the precautionary principle.120 In 2015 the rules
changed and thus European Union members can now ban cultivation of genetically modified crops on their territory,121 and ‘opt out’
imports of genetically engineered food and feed,122 even when the
117 See
State Labeling Initiatives, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY (2016),
http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/issues/976/ge-food-labeling/statelabeling-initiatives# [https://perma.cc/U85B-EVFB] (describing state-level GMO
labeling initiatives).
118 See Bull, supra note 34, at 135 (noting the trend toward regulatory harmonization).
119 Ned Stafford, New E.U. Law Lets Nations Ban Gene-Modified Crops,
CHEMISTRY WORLD (Jan. 19, 2015), reprinted in SCI. AM. (2016),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/new-e-u-law-lets-nations-ban-genemodified-crops/ [https://perma.cc/58WR-Y8NA] (noting the insect resistant
maize MON810 is the only GM crop cultivated in the EU, grown mainly in Spain
and Portugal. Since MON810 was approved for EU cultivation in 1998, no additional GM grains have won approval, with MON810 cultivation banned in Germany, France, Italy, and other nations, undermining the concept of a single European market).
120 See generally Directive 2001/18/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 12 March 2001 on the Deliberate Release into the Environment of Genetically Modified Organisms and Repealing Council Directive 90/220/EEC, 2001
O.J. (L 106). See also, The EU Regulatory System for GMOs, in UNCERTAIN RISKS
REGULATED 269 (Michelle Everson & Ellen Vos eds., Abingdon: RoutledgeCavendish, 2009) (providing a detailed discussion of Directive 2001/18/EC).
121 See Eight Things You Should Know about GMOs, EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT
NEWS, (Oct. 27, 2015), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/newsroom/20151013STO97392/Eight-things-you-should-know-about-GMOs
[https://perma.cc/9XN4-MXLS] (stating that under the law, EU nations will be
allowed to ban GMOs on the grounds of environmental policy, town and country
planning, socio-economic impact, avoiding the unintended presence of GMOs in
other products, and on farm policy objectives).
122 See Press Release, Office of the US Trade Representative, USTR Expresses
Concern over EU Proposal to Allow Member States to Ban the Use of GE Food

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/1

2016]

RIGHT TO REGULATE

31

science-based safety and environmental determinations made by
the European Union allow the importation and sale of genetically
modified crops. 123
As the two regulatory approaches are debated, other countries
look on with interest. In the 1980s and 1990s, interest in the precautionary principle rapidly spread well beyond Europe.124 To further economic trade, developing countries have had to align with
one of the competing regulatory schemes125 with African nations
aligning with the precautionary principle, presumably due to historical ties with Europe. Other factors outside of trade relations
help spread the precautionary principle.
Over the last few decades the precautionary principle has become an established element not only of international environmental law, but also the domestic environmental law of a number of
countries such as Australia, Canada,126 and India. Recently, Japan
used the precautionary principle to justify a trade measure which
restricted apple imports from the United States in order to prevent
the introduction of the ‘fire blight’ plant disease (which affects
plants but has no human health consequence).127 In Japan-Apples,
the United States challenged Japan’s measures in the WTO and Japan defended the restrictions as ‘precautionary’, arguing for deference to Japanese national authorities in their interpretation of the
scientific evidence.128 The WTO found the measure violated the

and Food Deemed Safe by EU (Apr. 22, 2015), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policyoffices/press-office/press-releases/2015/april/ustr-expresses-concern-over-eu
[https://perma.cc/XG6B-WZGF] (expressing concern about a movement toward
regulatory disharmony).
123 Eight Things You Should Know About GMOs, supra note 121.
124 See WHO, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 93, at 46 (noting the
widespread agreement on the precautionary principle).
125 See e.g. Morris, supra note 4 (noting that this is true of products that both
do or do not contain GMOs).
126 Precautionary Principles: Government Positions - Canada, Sci. & Envtl.
Health Network, http://www.sehn.org/canada.htmlvv [https://perma.cc/ED74LFQ6] (”’More than 70 municipalities (including Vancouver, British Columbia;
Montreal, Quebec; and Halifax, Nova Scotia) have already passed bylaws prohibiting the cosmetic use of pesticides, and many more cities are poised to pass bans
now that the Supreme Court has cleared the way.’ Early bans cited the precautionary principle”).
127 Panel Report, World Trade Organization, Japan-Measures Affecting the
Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/RW (adopted June 23, 2005) [hereinafter Japan-Apples].
128 Id.
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SPS Agreement because it lacked scientific support129 and was “a
disguised restriction on international trade”.130 Japan-Apples –
while dealing with plant health and not human health – illustrates
that the WTO dispute settlement decisions have narrowly interpreted the SPS Agreement to allow for standards set by scientific
evidence (against the precautionary principle). Such a narrow perspective could potentially reverse a ban on the importation of
AquAdvantage Salmon in Europe.131
And yet, while over the last few decades the precautionary
principle has become an established element in the domestic law of
certain countries, some argue that countries oscillate between approaches to regulation based on the target of regulation. Notwithstanding common perceptions concerning greater desire for the
precautionary principle in Europe, the reality is that United States
regulations are more precautionary than their European counterparts in some areas and less so in other areas (e.g. limitations on
carbon emissions are stricter in Europe),132 while in some areas, the
level of precaution is nearly equivalent (e.g. auto safety standards).
This has implications on regulatory convergence— where one side
is significantly more precautionary than the other, the likelihood of
regulatory convergence is limited.133 The following sections draw
upon trade disputes (emerging from philosophical differences or
otherwise) to motivate the need for more international regulatory
Id.
See WTO SPS Agreement, Article 5.5 (and by association Article 2.3),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/QVU7-3AS2] (“each Member shall avoid arbitrary or unjustifiable distinctions in the levels it considers to be appropriate in different situations,
if such distinctions result in discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade”).
131 See e.g. Steve Connor, Genetically Modified Salmon Becomes First to be Approved for Human Consumption – But it Won’t Have to be Labelled as GM, The Independent
(Nov.
19,
2015),
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
science/genetically-modified-salmon-becomes-first-to-be-approved-for-humanconsumption-but-it-wont-have-to-a6741031.html
[https://perma.cc/8UDCPQZY] (“’There remain legitimate ecological concerns over the possible consequences if GM salmon escape to the wild and reproduce, despite FDA assurances
over containment and sterility, neither of which can be guaranteed,’ said Joe Perry, former chair the GM panel of the European Food Safety Authority.”)
132 Reeve Bull, Answering TTIP’s Critics: Regulatory Cooperation in Risk Assessment
and
Risk
Management
(Dec.
2,
2016),
https://
regulatorystudies.columbian.gwu.edu/answering-ttips-critics-regulatorycooperation-risk-assessment-and-risk-management
[https://perma.cc/FGB9GTWB] [hereinafter Bull, Answering].
133 Id.
129
130
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cooperation.
2.4. Regulatory ‘Collisions’
This section makes the case for more international regulatory
cooperation using examples of related to food safety. Japan-Apples
is an example of a regulatory ‘collision’– a historical moment
where countries have sought to reduce regulatory differences
through a formal trade dispute under the WTO dispute settlement
system.
Before discussing other disputes and as an introduction to the
WTO framework, nations have long understood that membership
in the world trade order signals a willingness to prioritize trade
gains and harmonization over sovereignty.134 The Original GATT
agreement of 1947, and the subsequent GATT agreement of 1994,
provide countries with autonomy to establish food regulations,
within limits. Members have a right to enact domestic regulations135 (even if enacted at the sub-national level), that are based on
science, international standards, and are not more trade restrictive
than necessary. Members also have a duty to notify the Sanitary
(animal life) and Phytosanitary (plant life) (together, “SPS”) Committee136 of all new regulations that pertain to human and animal
plant life and health, and all modifications to existing regulations
that do not conform to international standards and produce a significant effect on international trade.137 Examples include prohibi134 Tracey Epps, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND HEALTH PROTECTION: A CRITICAL
ASSESSMENT OF THE WTO’S SPS AGREEMENT (Edward Elgar ed. 2008); see also Susy
Frankel, The Legitimacy and Purpose of Intellectual Property Chapters in FTAs, in
CHALLENGES TO MULTILATERAL TRADE: THE IMPACT OF BILATERAL, PREFERENTIAL AND
REGIONAL AGREEMENTS, (Ross Buckley, Vai lo Lo, & Laurence Boulle eds., 2008)
185 – 200.
135 The SPS Agreement uses the terms “measures” and “regulations” somewhat interchangeably. Regardless of the term used, the Agreement is referring to
any sanitary or phytosanitary measure such as laws, decrees, or ordinances applied to protection human, animal or plant life or health as defined under paragraph 1 of Annex A to the SPS Agreement.
136 See The WTO Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, supra 55, at art. 7 (stating that the Committee meets 3 times per
year and all 160 WTO members, acceding countries and observers, have the right
to attend its meetings).
137 See World Trade Organization, Recommended Transparency Procedures
(Dec. 1, 2008), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/notification_
formats_e.htm [https://perma.cc/A9K8-AR6X] (providing recommendations to
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tions on the sale of an imported product on health grounds, and
positive requirements for imported products (ex. Certification requirements).138
Using Japan-Apples as an example, a WTO claim begins with a
sixty-day consultation period between parties139 after which, if
necessary, a Panel is established to hear the dispute. The Panel delivers a decision, which can be accepted by the opposing party or
sent to the Appellate Body on appeal. A claim is grounded on the
GATT Agreements—most commonly the SPS Agreement (covering
measures which influence domestic food safety and quality, and
animal and plant health regulations),140 and the TBT Agreement
(covering measures which affect other technical requirements such
as certification, labeling and standardization that apply to agricultural products both domestically and in international trade)141. A
regulation that restricts international trade may qualify for an exception: GATT Article XX allows governments to enact measures
in order to protect human, animal or plant life or health, provided
they do not discriminate or use this as disguised protectionism.142
ensure regulatory transparency).
138 Sykes, supra 49.
139 See Dispute Settlement: Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes art. 4.7, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, 1869 U.N.T.S. 401 [hereinafter
DSU] (stating that a complaining party may request for a panel to be established
within sixty days upon failure of consultation to settle a dispute).
140 Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures
art. 5.5, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1867 U.N.T.S. 493 (and by association Article 2.3) [hereinafter
SPS]. An example of an SPS claim argues that importing countries are not adhering to international standards and that parties experience long delays in completing risk assessments.
141 Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade art. 1.3, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1A, 1886
U.N.T.S. 120 [hereinafter TBT]. For a recent WTO TBT case, see Technical Barriers
to Trade Standard Committee, Standards Committee Discusses Tyres, Toy Safety
and
Food,
World
Trade
Organization
(Nov.
6,
2015),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/tbt_10nov15_e.htm [https://
perma.cc/YHC2-C5KS] (“[When India decided] to limit the entry of apples to the
port of Nhava Sheva, some delegations argued that this would increase delays
and create additional costs for producers and exporters. India stated that this
measure was neither a technical regulation, standard nor conformity assessment
procedure, and therefore did not fall within the scope of application of the TBT
Agreement.”).
142 Article XX of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade states:
“[s]ubject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on
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A total of 502 cases have been brought to the WTO since
1996;143 roughly one quarter of these144 (94 cases) implicated food
and were brought under the SPS Agreement and the TBT Agreement which can at times involve food products. Forty–three cases
(9% of the total) cited the SPS agreement in their requests for consultations145, and fifty–one cases (10% of the total) cited the TBT in
their requests for consultations.146 Since the start of the WTO, there
have been twelve SPS disputes leading to Panels.147 Refer to the
international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent the
adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures: . . . (b) necessary
to protect human, animal or plant life or health[.]” General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade, art XX, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
143 Current
Status
of
Disputes,
World
Trade
Organization,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_current_status_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/8NBZ-XUMK] (last visited 9/12/2016). See also Ambassador
Demetrios Marantis, Office of the U.S. Trade Rep. 2013 Report on Sanitary and
Phytosanitary
Measures,
(2013),
www.ustr.gov/sites/default/files/
2013%20SPS.pdf [https://perma.cc/DVJ6-FSZT] (stating from 2002–12, over 250
SPS disputes were raised under the WTO’s dispute settlement system).
144 Statistics, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://www.wto.org/english/
tratop_e/dispu_e/stats_e.htm [https://perma.cc/G8RB-2J25] (last visited Sept.
12, 2016) (exhibiting that 129 went to a WTO Panel).
145 Disputes
by
Agreement,
WORLD
TRADE
ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.ht
m?id=A19# [https://perma.cc/K62R-MDTS] (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
146 Disputes
by Agreement, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A2
2# [https://perma.cc/V67S-RG7B] (last visited Sept. 12, 2016).
147 Alberto Alemano, The Multilateral Governance Framework for Food Safety: A
Critical and Normative Overview, 9-45, in FOOD SAFETY, MARKET ORGANIZATION,
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT 20 (Abdelhakim Hammoudi et al. eds., Springer Publishers: New York 2015). See e.g., Panel Report, European Communities—Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WTO Doc. WT/DS26/R/USA
(Aug. 18, 1997) [hereinafter EC—Hormones] (detailing a dispute between the U.S.
and the EC); Panel Report, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Salmon,
WTO Doc. WT/DS18/R (June, 12 2000) [hereinafter Japan—Salmon] (explaining a
dispute between Canada and Australia); Panel Report, Japan—Measures Affecting
Agricultural Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS76/R (Oct. 7, 1998) [hereinafter Japan—
Measures Agricultural Product II] (stating a dispute between the U.S. and Japan);
Japan—Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WTO Doc. WT/DS245/R (June
15, 2003) [hereinafter Japan—Apples] (detailing a dispute between the U.S. and
Japan); Summary of Disputes, Australia—Certain Measures Affecting the Importation
of Fresh Fruit and Vegetables, WTO Doc. WT/DS270/RW (Aug. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Australia— Fresh Fruit and Vegetable] (stating a dispute between Philippines
and Australia); Notification of Mutually Agreed Resolution, Australia—Quarantine
Regime for Imports, WTO Doc. WT/DS287/RW (March 9, 2007) [hereinafter Australia—Quarantine] (terminating a dispute between the EC and Australia); Panel
Report: European Communities—Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of
Biotech Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS291,292, 293/INTERIM (Sept. 29, 2006) [hereinafter EC—Biotech] (stating that the EC violated WTO rules when it imposed a
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Appendix for a list.
First, what has emerged from the SPS jurisprudence is a complex set of rulings on questions of sufficient scientific evidence and
appropriate risk assessment that constrain the regulatory autonomy of WTO members in the SPS field.148 The trend is to interpret
SPS decisions through a narrow lens that “elevates the policing of
trade restrictive measures above the ability of national governments to address risk in the face of scientific uncertainty.”149
Among the twelve regulatory collisions listed above, EC-Biotech
is an example of a regulatory collision evolving from philosophical
differences. This case involved complaints by the U.S., Canada and
Argentina concerning European Community measures (a moratorium on the approval and marketing of biotech products), which
allegedly violated the SPS Agreement.
Since the WTO rules state that trade measures must be based
on international standards, if international standards exist, they
will be used. In the EC-Biotech decision, the WTO Panel cited the
Codex principles and guidelines on the safety of foods derived
from genetically-modified plants, animals and microorganisms.150
moratorium on the approval of biotech products); Appellate Body Report, United
States—Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC—Hormones Dispute, WTO Doc.
WT/DS320/AB/R (Oct. 16, 2008) [hereinafter US—Suspension] (indicating that
the U.S. violated WTO rules by failing to remove retaliatory measures against the
EC); Summary of Dispute, Australia—Measures Affecting Importation of Apples from
New Zealand, WTO Doc. WT/DS367 (Sept. 2, 2011) [hereinafter Australia—
Apples] (detailing a dispute between New Zealand and Australia); Summary of
Dispute, United States—Certain Country of Origin Labelling Requirements, WTO Doc.
WT/DS384/8 (June 29, 2012) [hereinafter US-COOL (Canada)] (stating a labeling
dispute between Canada and the U.S.); Summary of Dispute, United States Certain
Country of Origin Labelling Requirements (WTO Doc. WT/DS386/7 (Dec. 21,
2015)[hereinafter US-COOL (Mexico)] (stating a labelling dispute between Mexico
and the U.S.); Appellate Body Report, Australia—Measures Affecting the Importation
of Apples from New Zealand, WTO Doc. WT/DS367/AB/R (Nov. 29, 2010) (detailing a dispute between New Zealand and Australia on the importation of apples);
Panel Report, United States—Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China, WTO Doc. WT/DS392/R (Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter U.S—Poultry] (stating a
dispute between China and the U.S.); Panel Report, Korea—Measures Affecting the
Import of Bovine Meat and Meat Products from Canada, WTO Doc. WT/DS391/R (July 3, 2012) [hereinafter Korea—Bovine Meat (Canada)] (stating a dispute between
Canada and Korea).
148 See Mann, supra note 35, at 263.
149 See Alan O. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence
Requirements: A Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. OF INT’L L. 368 (2002).
150
See Summary of Dispute, European Communities—Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,WTO Doc. WT/DS 291,292,
293/INTERIM [hereinafter EC—Biotech] (summarizing disputes between the U.S.
and EC, between Canada and EC and Argentina and EC).
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The United States won EC-Biotech but suspended the retaliatory
proceedings in the WTO in order to provide the European Union
with “an opportunity to demonstrate meaningful progress in the
approval of biotech products.”151 This shows that a government
that chooses to build a regulatory mechanism addressing the food
safety of genetically-modified foods can use Codex text as the baseline, with each government adopting its own GMOs policy.152
However, given that there are no internationally agreed-upon
standards on the labeling of genetically modified foods, countries
are free to apply their own labeling regulations.
Next, the TBT jurisprudence also demonstrates examples of
regulatory collisions regarding labeling, though not necessarily
based upon philosophical differences. Generally speaking, TBT jurisprudence153 has focused on whether a food label amounts to a
trade restriction by balancing the discriminatory impacts a label
151 Press Release, U.S. Trade Representative, Statement on the EC—Biotech
Dispute (Jan. 2008), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/archives/2008/january/statement-ec-biotech-dispute
[https://perma.cc/7QF3-33DV].
152 FAQs—Question
about Specific Codex Work, CODEX ALIMENTARIUS,
http://www.codexalimentarius.org/faqs/specific-codex-work/en/ (last visited
Sept. 11, 2016) [https://perma.cc/XE44-AJAA] [hereinafter FAQ, Codex] (“Codex
has adopted principles and guidelines to assess food safety of foods derived from
recombinant-DNA plants, animals and microorganisms.”).
A government that chooses to build a regulatory mechanism addressing the food
safety of GM foods can use Codex text as a basis, but each government is free to
adopt its own policy as to the use of GM organisms in the agriculture and other
sectors. At the moment, there are no internationally agreed-upon recommendations on the food labeling of GM foods. Governments are therefore applying their
own regulations.
153 See e.g., EC—Biotech, supra note 150 (holding that the regulations at bar
are not impermissibly restrictive of trade or discriminatory because they are based
on legitimate concerns). Panel Report, United States—Measures Affecting the Production and Sale of Clove Cigarettes, WTO Doc. WT/DS406/R (Sept. 2 2011) [hereinafter US—Clove Cigarettes] (analyzing whether the U.S. ban on clove cigarettes was
inconsistent, discriminatory, and necessary to achieve the end of reducing youth
smoking.); US-COOL (Canada), supra note 147 (analyzing whether the country of
origin labeling requirements under U.S. law give less favourable treatment to foreign goods, namely imported livestock products); Panel Report, United States—
Measures Concerning the Importation, Marketing and Sale of Tuna and Tuna Products,
WTO Doc. WT/DS381/R (Sept. 15, 2011) [hereinafter US—Tuna] (analyzing
whether the “dolphin-safe labeling standards” discriminated against Mexican tuna products, and whether the regulations were necessary); Appellate Body Report, United States—Measures Concerning the Importation Marketing and Sale of Tuna
and Tuna Products, WT/DS381/AB/R (May 16, 2012) [hereinafter US—Tuna II
Appeal] (analyzing whether the “dolphin-safe labeling standards” discriminated
against Mexican tuna products, and whether the regulations were necessary).
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may have on imports against the legitimate purpose of the label itself. Several WTO cases that implicate the TBT Agreement have
involved whether the state has managed the use of the label;
whether the label conforms to international standards; and whether the application of the labeling standard discriminates between
imports and like domestic products.154
Perhaps you have seen a package with the label, “dolphin safe.”
This label was the focus of a recent WTO challenge wherein the
TBT Agreement was successfully invoked to overturn a federal
U.S. food labeling standard on tuna. This case, U.S-Tuna, involved
a regulatory collision – between the U.S. and its desire to regulate
fishing practices (the use of fishing nets that are dangerous to dolphins) through a mandatory food labeling standard (“dolphin
safe”), and Mexico’s fishing practices.155 Mexico challenged these
rules under the TBT agreement,156 making three leading claims:
that United States dolphin-safe labelling provisions discriminate
against Mexican tuna products, that the United States dolphin-safe
labelling provisions are more trade-restrictive than necessary to
fulfill the legitimate objectives, and lastly, that United States dolphin-safe labelling provisions violate the requirement that regulations be based on relevant international standards where possible.157 In the end, a WTO panel struck down the labeling statute.
In another high-profile case, the United States lost a WTO challenge and was asked to weaken domestic regulations to comply
with a ruling on the Country of Origin Labeling Rule.158
154 Elizabeth Trujillo, Draft, New Visions for International Trade and Sustainable
Development (Nov. 2015).
155 US—Tuna, supra note 153; US-Tuna II Appeal, supra note 153.
156
See Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, art. 2.1, 2.2, 2.4, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, 1868
U.N.T.S. 120 (establishing standards for regulation in order reduce barriers to
trade).
157 US—Tuna, supra note 153.
158 The COOL rule requires retail food stores to inform consumers about the
country of origin of fresh fruits and vegetables, fish, shellfish, peanuts, pecans,
macadamia nuts, ginseng, and ground and muscle cuts of beef, pork, lamb, chicken, and goat. The rule has been controversial with respect to meat products, leading Canada and Mexico to challenge the rule in the WTO, arguing that COOL has
a trade-distorting impact by reducing the value and number of cattle and hogs
shipped to the U.S. market. In 2011, a WTO Panel found COOL rules to be in violation of the WTO, in 2012 the U.S. appealed, and was asked to amend the rule.
After doing so, it is waiting for a decision from the WTO compliance panel to determine if the final COOL rule complies with WTO findings. See also, Dan Flynn,
New COOL Rule Might Result in Retaliatory Tariffs, FOOD SAFETY NEWS (May 24,
2013), available at http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/05/new-cool-rule-
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A WTO claim can have many implications and has the potential to shape domestic and transnational regulatory governance
through broader systemic influences.159 The SPS and TBT agreements have been found to offer the same level of right to regulate,
with the TBT jurisprudence showing a more cautious stance.160
While much of the litigation under SPS and TBT Agreements has
led to a clarification of a regulatory norm, the cases where the dispute took a long time to resolve or continues to persist (see, e.g.,
U.S.-Tuna) are more troublesome and underscore a need for cooperative regulation.161
Critically, countries have gone so far as continuing to violate
the WTO rules to preserve their right to regulate (see e.g., EUHormones, the SPS case involving a European Union ban on meat
imports treated with hormones).162 EU-Hormones illustrates that,
for WTO members, the rules constrain the right to regulate only by
making it more costly to exercise that right. The European Union
lost this case based on their adherence to the precautionary principle, and incurred trade-related remedies to the United States. This
illustrates that while most WTO Members view the rules as ‘hard’
constraints, some treat them as ‘soft’ constraints.

might-result-in-retaliatory-tariffs/#.U-gQrGPou8w
[https://perma.cc/T9RGNZ3K) (discussing potential retaliatory tariffs that Mexico and Canada could put
in place after U.S. issued its regulation); Tenille Tracey, House Votes to Remove
Country of Origin Labels on Meat Sold in the U.S., WALL STREET JOURNAL, June 10,
2015, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/house-votes-to-remove-countryof-origin-labels-on-meat-sold-in-u-s-1433990294 [https://perma.cc/9X4B-LAUC]
(“The House voted late Wednesday to remove country-of-origin labels on beef,
pork and chicken sold in the U.S., hoping to prevent a protracted battle over the
labels with Canada and Mexico”).
159 See generally Gregory C. Shaffer, How the WTO Shapes Regulatory Governance, 9 REG. & GOVERNANCE, 1 (2015) (providing a framework for assessing the
regulatory implications of the WTO).
160 See Wagner, Regulatory Space, supra note 2 at 66-67 (seeking to balance liberalization of trade obstacles and state regulatory rights).
161 See e.g., US—Tuna, supra note 153; US—Tuna II Appeal supra note 153
(noting that in the US—Tuna II Art. 21.5 Appeal, the Appellate Body did not clarify how the US should change its dolphin-safe tuna labeling scheme for it to become compliant with WTO law. The judges stressed that, however, the measure
lacked even-handedness in application, as it left US consumers with the risk of
buying dolphin-unfriendly tuna products.)
162 Compare how the EC continued to violate the WTO rules inEC—
Hormones with U.S. behavior-the U.S. rescinded Country of Origin Labeling
(“COOL”) after the recent WTO ruling in US-COOL.
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2.5. ‘Imminent’ Regulatory Collisions
Not all regulatory differences result in outright collisions, and
many WTO trade disputes are resolved or prevented before they
reach the consultation phase. This section describes ‘imminent collisions’—or regulatory differences, which may collide in the WTO,
that show the most promise for cooperation.
The data on ‘imminent collisions’ come from: formal notifications made by WTO Members to the WTO SPS or TBT Committees
concerning newly adopted SPS or TBT measures, and informal
concerns stemming from controversial regulations in the United
States and elsewhere.
The first source of data on imminent collisions comes from
formal notifications from WTO Members to the WTO SPS Committee of any newly adopted SPS measures, or SPS measures which
have been changed. Under the WTO SPS and TBT Committees,
members are free to raise Specific Trade Concerns (STCs) about
other members’ measures, which they believe are inconsistent with
provisions of the SPS or TBT Agreements.163 An examination of
current concerns before these two reveals the type of regulatory
collisions that are quelled before reaching the consultation phase.
Since 1995, when the SPS Agreement was established, 312 STCs regarding SPS measures were raised, 28% of these concerning food
safety. Twenty-two food-standard-related STCs were raised in
2010-11, nine regarding chemical maximum residue limits, six regarding specific foods, and two regarding labeling. These cases illustrate that SPS measures are actively contested.
A recent meeting of the Committee on Technical Barriers to
Trade examined 92 STCs regarding TBT measures in 2015 – the
second-highest number in a single year since 1995.164 In the TBT
arena, STCs can relate to standards, testing and certification procedures, regulations or labeling requirements imposed by the importing country, and are said to impact companies producing these
goods and consumers who use them. Two of the three most critiSee e.g. Note by the Secretariat, Specific Trade Concerns, WTO Doc.
G/SPS/GEN/204/Rev.16 (Feb. 23, 2016) (exemplifying an instance of member
states raising trade concerns).
164 WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, Minutes of the meeting of Nov. 4-6,
2015,
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S009-DP.aspx?
language=E&CatalogueIdList=231304,230729,228723,226671,134466,132661,
132294,130728,130294,127112&CurrentCatalogueIdIndex=3&FullTextHash= .
163
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cal TBT concerns relate to food. The first STC related to a proposed
European Union ban on products derived from cloned animals,165
where the United States and Brazil considered that this proposed
measure may be more trade restrictive than necessary, and questioned the supporting scientific evidence. The EU provided an update on the ongoing decision-making process for this measure and
expressed its willingness to further discuss the matter. The second
STC related to the limitation of entry points for apples into India
and a European Union decision to withdraw “equivalence” recognition of Indian organic products.166
One final observation is that many STCs relate to labeling. Labeling concerns are increasingly important in the TBT Committee –
a timely and relevant topic for the United States where nearly 300
food labeling bills were introduced in state legislatures in 2014-15,
including: nutrition disclosures, sugary drinks warnings, identification of local products such as olive oil and seafood, and disclosure of GMO ingredients. Indonesia, the EU, India, Ecuador and
Chinese Taipei have brought STCs regarding labeling regulations
on: sugar, salt and fat content, health messages on processed and
packaged foods, different types of oils, genetically modified foods,
and the inclusion on labeling of foods which are endocrine disruptors.167
165 Id. Specifically, the STC was from the European Union — Proposal for a
Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Cloning of Animals of the bovine, porcine, ovine, caprine and equine specifies kept and reproduced for farming purposes (197) and Proposal for a Council Directive on the
placing on the market of food from animal clones (198).
166 “With respect to India’s decision to limit the entry of apples to the port of
Nhava Sheva, some delegations argued that this would increase delays and create
additional costs for producers and exporters. India stated that this measure was
neither a technical regulation, standard nor conformity assessment procedure,
and therefore did not fall within the scope of application of the TBT Agreement.
Regarding the EU decision to no longer recognize equivalence of India’s organic
products, India was of the view that this measure was overly burdensome for
producers and would hinder trade with the EU. The EU in turn argued that India
had not satisfied provisions contained in the bilateral agreement which recognized such equivalence.” WTO, Standards Committee Discusses Tyres, Toy Safety and
Food, https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news15_e/tbt_10nov15_e.htm (last
accessed Sept. 21, 2016) [https://perma.cc/SX2J-HALF].
167 The regulations are: inclusion of sugar, salt and fat content information, as
well as health messages on the label of processed foods (Indonesia); Categorization of Compounds as Endocrine Disruptors’ (EU); Processed and Packaged Food
Products (Ecuador); Canola Oil (India); genetically modified foods (Chinese Taipei).
See Technical Barriers to Trade, WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm
(last
viewed
on
9/30/2016) [https://perma.cc/9B6R-STYG] (providing a data base for viewing
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Labeling rules corresponding to GMOs are an imminent
regulatory collision. Recall the discussion of AquAdvantage, an
FDA-approved genetically modified salmon produced in the United States. As noted previously, the United States and European
approaches to regulating the production, cultivation, and trade in
GMOs differ. The labeling of GMOs is a controversial issue in the
United States, with recently passed Federal GM legislation
preempting individual state laws on the matter.168 The topic is
equally controversial outside the United States where rules on
genetically modified foods differ widely.
Generally speaking, in the United States and elsewhere, many
food regulations are being proposed that could evolve into imminent collisions. While, as noted, future measures to protect public
health, animal health and plant health may include labeling of
GMOs, future measures may also include: a ban on products related to cloning, the use of growth hormones and endocrine disrupting chemicals, antimicrobial resistance to antibiotics, plant synthetic biology, and laws related to the humane treatment of animals –
such as the ‘State of California’s Egg Rule’ regulating the humane
treatment of egg-laying chickens.169
The regulation of nanotechnology is likely to invoke a regulatory collision. Nanotech is a new frontier170 backed by a billiondollar industry, which is expected to grow.171 Every major food
corporation either has a program in nanotech or is looking to deregulations and cases).
168 Mary Clarke Jalonick, Obama Signs Bill Requiring Labeling of GMO Foods,
WASHINGTON POST (July 29, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
lifestyle/food/obama-signs-bill-requiring-labeling-of-gmo-foods/2016/07/29/
1f071d66-55d2-11e6-b652-315ae5d4d4dd_story.html
[https://perma.cc/P8RQWSRS]. For the individual state legislation this preempted, see State Labeling Initiatives, CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY (2015), http://www.centerforfoodsafety.org/
issues/976/ge-food-labeling/state-labeling-initiatives# [https://perma.cc/K5XRKT6C].
169 See e.g. Treatment of Farm Animals Prohibitions, Cal. Health & Safety
Code § 25990 (West) (requiring poultry eggs to come from chickens that have
enough room to fully extend their limbs and turn around freely); Labeling of Food
Produced with Genetic Engineering, Vt. Admin. Code 3-2-118A:CP 121 (requiring
labeling of genetically modified foods); see also Regulation (EU) 2015/2283, 2015
O.J. (L 327) 1 (the European Union’s regulation on nanofoods and cloned foods).
170 See generally FAO/WHO Expert Meeting, supra note 6.
171 See Tiju Johnson and Mark Morrison, Nanotechnology in Agriculture and
Food,
EUROPEAN
NANOTECHNOLOGY
GATEWAY
(Apr.
2006)
ftp://ftp.cordis.europa.eu/pub/nanotechnology/docs/nanotechnology_in_
agriculture_and_food.pdf [(citing a report produced by Helmut Kaiser Consultancy, entitled Nanotechnology in Food and Food Processing Industry Worldwide).
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velop one.172 And while such nanotechnology ingredients can be
beneficial (holding promise in their ability to combat issues such as
obesity, malnutrition), scientists are considering their potential
health and safety risks for consumption.173 The FDA does not require nanoparticles to be labeled in foods but some consumers in
the United States are lobbying for it. Meanwhile, Codex sets
standards on food additives, but does not set standards on either
the use of nanotechnology in food or GMO labeling,174 making
these issues ripe for an ‘imminent’ regulatory collision.
The STCs illustrate that the field of possible disputes is larger
than actual disputes which reach the WTO. These imminent collisions could be resolved through more mechanisms for international regulatory cooperation.
3. THE PROBLEM: CURRENT TREATIES DO NOT MEET THE DEMAND
FOR MORE COOPERATIVE REGULATION
New approaches to IRC are needed to raise levels of food safety, to keep pace with emerging new technologies in food production and to mollify intensifying philosophical differences, regulatory collisions, and imminent regulatory collisions. This section
describes a wish list for cooperative regulation to increase food
safety-essentially, what is missing from traditional approaches to
international regulatory cooperation leading to a new framework
for cooperative regulation -- found in the Mega-Regional.

172 See Gaidos, supra note 7 (quoting Jozef Kokini, the Director of the Center
for Advanced Food Technology at Rutgers University, USA).
173 Id.
174 See FAQ, Codex supra note 152 (“Codex has adopted principles and guidelines to assess food safety of foods derived from recombinant‐DNA plants, animals and microorganisms. If a government chooses to build a regulatory mechanism to address the food safety of so‐called GM foods, then they can use Codex
text as a basis for it. This being said, each government is free to adopt its own policy as to the use of GM organisms in the agriculture and other sectors. At the moment, there are no internationally‐agreed recommendations on the food labelling
of GM foods. Governments are therefore applying their own regulations.”).
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3.1. The ‘Wish List’ for Expanding Cooperative Regulation to Raise
Food Safety
While countries face a menu of challenges, they also have a list
of IRC techniques at their disposal. To strengthen food safety, for
example, the United States uses some but not all techniques. This
section provides a ‘wish list’ for cooperative regulation and proposes the TPP as a mechanism for improving IRC and food safety.
The WHO and the FAO have identified specific IRC needs with
respect to food safety risks. The World Health Organization reports that surveillance of foodborne diseases is becoming an increasingly high priority on the public health agenda of many countries.175 Cooperation is required on many levels—in the rapid
detection of incidents, identification of causative agents and foods,
and the prompt and effective response to contain and mitigate any
adverse health and economic effects. This includes maintaining
sensitive and rapid alert systems, detailed and well-tested preparedness plans, and rapid and effective emergency response systems
with links to relevant international networks.176
Meanwhile, the FAO notes that many non-industrialized countries lack the resources to conduct meaningful surveillance, and
even the countries that undertake surveillance may be using different methods and have different standards.177 These countries need
trained staff in government, adequately staffed and equipped laboratories, and trained health care professionals to identify and report diseases and timely alerts via current notification processes.178
Establishing consistent laboratory methodologies and training,
emergency preparedness training and procedures, database development, further assistance for non-industrialized countries, and
strengthened communication networks are key strategies to advance the status of international foodborne disease surveillance.
Finally, the FAO notes that even in the United States, agencies face
problems with coordination in that the USDA and the FDA would
benefit from better coordination, both nationally and internationally, linking surveillance outcomes with what we observe with foods

Id.
See FAO, International Cooperation, supra note 65 (discussing the international coordination of response systems to food safety risks).
177 Id.
178 Id.
175
176
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in the United States.179
Other elements on the ‘wish list’ are mechanisms to assist with
risk assessment (the objective evaluation of the risk of certain activities) or risk management (the subjective process by which regulators use the data produced during risk assessment and, combining
data with relevant policy considerations, determine society’s risk
preferences and what regulations are required to achieve those
preferences).180 This emerges from the rise in trade conflicts related
to philosophical differences and points to a need to coordinate
regulatory policy in a way that manages and reduces those differences. In the case of genetically modified foods, the regulatory
problem is clear: while one side (the European Union) strongly
supports regulations designed to prohibit or label genetically modified foods (risk management), the other side (the United States)
counters that existing scientific studies identify little to no risk with
such products (risk assessment).181 Here, regulatory disparities are
not accidental:182 both sets of regulators are relying on disparate
scientific studies, not because their citizens exhibit a unique level of
risk tolerance. While it may be impossible to separate issues of risk
assessment and risk management183, regulatory cooperation on risk
assessment may be possible through dialogue, information sharing, and scientific fact-finding.184 Cooperation on risk assessment
is possible by examining the science behind various regulatory approaches and determining which approach aligns with prevailing
Id.
See Bull, Developing a Domestic Framework for International Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 34 (detailing a vision of cooperation in international regulatory
risk assessment and risk management). See also Bull, Answering, supra note 132
(suggesting more careful disambiguation of risk assessment and risk management
within the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership).
181 See Bull, Answering, supra note 132 (discussing risk assessment with genetically modified foods and other “unnatural” agricultural products).
182 See Bull, Developing a Domestic Framework for International Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 34 at 58 (noting that accidental disparities have occurred when
“trading partners have historically failed to coordinate regulatory policy and
therefore often enact divergent regulatory approaches merely as a matter of historical accident”).
183 Risk management is subjective and depends on the risk tolerance of the
population at issue. For instance, the level of confidence required to accept a finding as “proven” (e.g., a 95% level of confidence, or a 99% confidence interval),
while essential to scientific investigations, represents a risk management determination.
184 See Bull, Answering, supra note 132 (suggesting a more careful disambiguation of risk assessment and risk management within the Transatlantic Trade and
Investment Partnership).
179
180
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scientific knowledge.185 All credible scientists subscribe to the scientific method as the mechanism applied to testing existing views,
theories, and uncovering facts.186 At some point, scientists will decide on a result using available data and empirical methods to test
hypotheses. And at some point, agencies will decide to foreclose
consideration of any additional evidence in order to make a regulatory decision.187 Information-sharing among scientists worldwide
can mitigate this problem by ensuring that new studies will diffuse
as rapidly as possible across international boundaries. As Reeve
Bull points out, “the Administrative Conference of the United
States has recommended that regulatory scientists work with their
international counterparts to share data sets, divide responsibility
for conducting otherwise duplicative tests, and achieve the efficiencies that arise from maintaining a global network of researchers.”188
Cooperation on risk management is more challenging because
it depends on the public’s level of risk tolerance189, even if the general public is more impressionistic than scientific190 and even when
decision-making is skewed or captured.191 One suggestion is to
enhance citizen input in agency policymaking, leading citizens to
185 See Bull, Developing a Domestic Framework for International Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 34 at 63 (suggesting methods to increase regulatory cooperation
in risk management).
186 See John L. Campbell, INTRODUCTION TO SCIENCE AND THE SCIENTIFIC
METHOD (2008) at 11 (cataloguing the scientific method’s rise to general acceptance in the community of scientists).
187 See Wendy E. Wagner, SCIENCE IN REGULATION: A STUDY OF AGENCY
DECISIONMAKING APPROACHES 26–27 (2013), https://web.archive.org/web/
20160514055832/http://www.acus.gov/sites/default/files/documents/
Science%20in%20Regulation_Final%20Report_2_18_13_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/
CWK5-3NSL] (describing these rules as “Stopping rules”).
188 See Bull, Developing a Domestic Framework for International Regulatory Cooperation, supra note 34, at 61 (citing the Administrative Conference of the United
States, Recommendation 2011-6, International regulatory Cooperation, ¶¶ 3 – 6, 77
Fed. Reg. 2257, 2260-61 (Jan. 17, 2012), and providing examples of facilitating information sharing).
189 Id. at 63.
190 See Richard H. Pildes and Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory
State, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 55 – 56 (1995) (noting that “lay people assess risk
through different value frameworks rather than those implicitly embedded in expert approaches”).
191 See Wendy E. Wagner, Administrative Law, Filter Failure, and Information
Capture, 59 DUKE L. J. 1321, 1324 – 25 (2010) (“In the regulatory context, information capture refers to the excessive use of information and related information
costs as a means of gaining control over regulatory decisionmaking in informal
rulemakings”).
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change policy from the “bottom up”.192 Of course, cooperation is
possible if there are areas of mutual regulation. For instance, in
some contexts, the United States and European Union regulations
exhibit similar levels of precaution (e.g., auto safety standards),
and the likelihood of reaching agreement or mutual recognition is
considerably greater in those areas.193
3.2. Comparing Traditional Agreements with the ‘Wish List’
International economic treaties (Bilateral Investment Treaties194
and WTO Agreements, for example) have traditionally helped regulators from different countries working together to increase understanding of regulations across boundaries and influence rule
making from the bottom up.195 While Bilateral Investment Treaties
promote standard-setting, harmonization and equivalence196, often
192 See generally Reeve T. Bull, Making the Administrative State “Safe for Democracy”: A Theoretical and Practical Analysis of Citizen Participation in Agency Decisionmaking, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 611 (2013) (arguing that agencies should seek enhanced public input when it actually promotes a better outcome).
193 See Bull, Answering, supra note 132 (discussing regulatory convergence
when both sides treat issues with comparable levels of precaution).
194 Traditional investment agreements like the Model U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty are similar to Investment Chapters found in regional trade agreements with an investment chapter (e.g., The North American Free Trade Agreement, Chapter 11) and typically protect covered investments with “minimum
standards” and “fair and equitable treatment.”
195 See Ann-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy through Government
Networks, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS IN
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 204 (Michael Byers ed., 2000)
(discussing the role of international government networks). See also Janet Koven
Levit, A Bottom-up Approach to International Lawmaking: The Tale of Three Trade Financial Instruments, 30 YALE J. INT’L L. 125 (2005) (analyzing the bottom-up approach in three instruments—letter of credit, export credit insurance, and the official export credit guarantee); Kal Raustiala, The Architecture of International
Cooperation: Transgovernmental Networks and the Future of International Law, 43 VA. J.
INT’L L. 1 (2002) (arguing that the development of linkages among government
officials from diverse jurisdictions-peer-to-peer, using informal, often non-binding
agreements, and with limited oversight by foreign ministers-has been increasingly
recognized as an important component of contemporary cooperation).
196 See European Commission Releases Draft Proposal on TTIP Investment Court,
BRIDGES (Sept. 17, 2015), available at http://www.ictsd.org/bridgesnews/bridges/news/european-commission-releases-draft-proposal-on-ttipinvestment-court [https://perma.cc/EKN3-X2BM] (noting that protections include “guarantees against expropriation without compensation; the possibility of
transferring investment-related funds, commitments to ensure fair and equitable
treatment and physical security, commitments that governments respect obligations to investors that are written and legally binding, and guarantees of compen-
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in food related investment197, the focus here is on the WTO Agreements and trade-related measures because those Agreements directly affect food safety and because those Agreements bind all 160
member nations.
Members of the WTO ascribe to a baseline level of cooperative
regulation. The original GATT agreement of 1947 originated in the
postwar era—a period when policymakers fought to build a multilateral open world economy that was compatible with the desire
for national policy autonomy.198 Revised in 1996 when the WTO
was formed, the GATT obligates Members to harmonize trade relations by reducing tariffs, removing non-tariff barriers, and promoting free trade. Provisions such as most-favored-nation (GATT Article III) and national treatment (GATT Article IV) give members
the right to enact regulations on food and plant life that do not discriminate against other nations or similar products. And, as noted
earlier, two WTO Agreements—the SPS Agreement and the TBT
Agreement—promote harmonization and standard setting.
The SPS Agreement encourages regulatory cooperation
through standard-setting, harmonization, and equivalence. In
terms of harmonization, according to the WTO SPS Agreement,
Members have the right to regulate “to enact necessary measures”
(SPS Article 2.1) “to the extent necessary to protect human, animal
or plant life or health” (SPS Article 2.2) so long as trade measures
are not disguised trade restrictions.199 The SPS Agreement encourages governments to apply measures that are based on international standards (SPS Article 3.1)200—which, for international food
standards (such as packing and labeling) are the standards approved by Codex. Similarly, WTO Members are encouraged to
base their domestic veterinary legislation on the international reference standards adopted by the World Organization for Animal
Health.201 Standards beyond international standards are allowed
sation for those losses that arise in specific circumstances, such as armed conflicts”).
197 Investment chapters have the ability to stimulate investment in food and
agriculture—such as investments can be in farmland, food processing, agricultural inputs and services, wholesale distribution, and retail networks.
198 John G. Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36.2 International Organization 379, 379 –
415 (1982).
199 SPS Agreement, supra note 55.
200 See id. at art. 3.1, 3.2, and Annex A(3) (outlining specific provisions on
harmonization).
201 In the absence of domestic legislation, contractors could request that pro-
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but only “if there is scientific justification” (SPS Article 3.3).202 Finally, the SPS encourages equivalence for a specific measure or
measures related to a certain product or categories of products, or
on a systems-wide basis (SPS Article 4).203 It emphasizes that
equivalence of SPS measures does not require duplication or
sameness of measures, but the acceptance of alternative measures
that meet an importing Member's appropriate level of SPS protection.204
Next, the WTO TBT Agreement preamble directly speaks to
standard-setting by stating that it seeks “to encourage the development of such international standards and conformity assessment
systems” and to ensure “that technical regulations and standards,
including packaging, marking and labelling requirements, and
procedures for assessment of conformity with technical regulations
and standards do not create unnecessary obstacles to international
trade.”205 At the same time, the TBT Agreement recognizes WTO
members’ right to implement measures to achieve legitimate policy
objectives, such as the protection of human health, safety, or the
environment. The TBT Agreement, like the SPS Agreement, encourages governments to harmonize technical standards with international standards,206 unless those international standards are
ineffective for fulfilling the legitimate objective of the technical

ducers incorporate farming practices recommended by the OIE (like animal welfare standards), to facilitate access to international markets Several standards apply: for animal health, see the standards and guidelines developed under the auspices of the International Office of Epizootics, and for pant health, see the
international standards, guidelines and recommendations under the auspices of
the Secretariat of the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) in cooperation with regional organizations operating with the Framework of the IPPC.
202 See SPS Agreement, supra note 55 at art. 3.3 (“Members may introduce or
maintain sanitary or phytosanitary measures which result in a higher level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection than would be achieved by measures based on
the relevant international standards, guidelines or recommendations, if there is a
scientific justification”).
203 See id. at art. 4 (encouraging equivalent treatment between sanitary or
phytosanitary measure of other members to the agreement).
204 Id.
205 Agreement on Technical Barriers To Trade, 15 April 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex A 1868 U.N.T.S.
120 (1994) [hereinafter TBT Agreement]
206 However, the TBT does not define ‘international standard’.
See WTO
Newsroom on the TBT, World Trade Organization (2016), https://
www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tbt_e/tbt_e.htm [https://perma.cc/Z3VM-S6JT]
(summarizing news on the TBT agreement).
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regulation.207 Like the SPS, it also encourages ‘standard equivalence’ between countries—the formal acceptance of the standards
of other countries through explicit agreements.208 And like the SPS,
it mandates that countries establish inquiry points and national notification authorities in order to answer questions about TBT regulations and to notify other WTO members of new regulations.209
Finally, the TBT Agreement also encourages WTO Members to enter into negotiations with other Members for the mutual acceptance of conformity assessment results.210
While current treaties promote central IRC principles such as
standard-setting, harmonization and equivalence, they are not able
to provide everything on the wish list for cooperative regulation.
Gaps remain in surveillance of foodborne diseases and coordination (which, for non-industrialized countries, means developing
consistent laboratory methodologies and training, emergency preparedness training and procedures, and database development),
and in harmonizing risk assessment or risk management.
Current international trade treaties are also unable to resolve
some longstanding disputes and lingering issues remain in place.
Take for example US-Poultry, a WTO case brought by China
against the United States for a 2010 ban on Chinese poultry.211 In
this case, the WTO Panel ruled against the United States, stating
that the U.S. ban was not supported by scientific evidence. At the
time the measures were drafted, regulators were keenly aware of
notable food safety breaches in China—the highly publicized melamine in milk and adulterated pet food outbreaks—suggesting that
regulators recognized that new supply chain partners (China) may
not be able to provide the requisite regulatory framework and sufSee TBT Agreement, supra note 205 at art. 2.4.
See id. at 2.7 (“Members shall give positive consideration to accepting as
equivalent technical regulations of other Members”).
209 See id. at art. 2.9 and 5.6 (outlining the notification measures to other nations on new regulations).
210 See id. at art 6.3 (“Members are encouraged, at the request of other Members, to be willing to enter into negotiations for the conclusion of agreements for
the mutual recognition of results of each other's conformity assessment procedures”).
211 See Panel Report, United States-Certain Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry
from China, ¶7.154, WT/DS392/R (Sept. 29, 2010) [hereinafter US-Poultry], available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/392r_e.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V5ST-TP6E] (last accessed Sept. 22, 2016) (noting that without a U.S.
equivalence determination, China correctly argued, Chinese poultry products
could not enter U.S. markets).
207
208
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ficiently robust public health measures to ensure food safety.212
Since the US-Poultry decision, China banned poultry from the
United States for Avian Flu, and the United States is urging China
to continue its poultry exports, showing that trade in poultry continues to be problematic between the two countries .213
Finally, current international trade treaties have difficulty resolving cases regarding GMOs and food additives, where normative philosophies have a potential to collide.214 These cases highlight the need for other alternatives, such as regulatory
cooperation. The following section shows how Mega-Regionals
have the potential to provide more IRC mechanisms with respect
to food safety.
4. SOLUTION: THE MEGA-REGIONAL AS A FRAMEWORK FOR
ENHANCED COOPERATIVE REGULATION
The process of harmonization that began over forty years ago
with the GATT of 1947, and continued twenty years later with the
formation of the WTO, is gaining strength with greater determination through a new type of trade agreement, the Mega-Regional.
4.1. Mega-Regionals Expand Cooperation Found in Traditional
Treaties
The movement from traditional to modern agreements has
212 See Donald H. Regan, United States-Certain Measures Affecting Imports of
Poultry from China: The Fascinating Case That Wasn’t, 11 WORLD TRADE REVIEW 2,
273, 276 – 7 (2012) (observing that this was the first instance in which the basis for
the challenge was the claimed inability of the complainant country to enforce its
own food-safety rules). See also Lukasz Gruszczynski, United States-Certain
Measures Affecting Imports of Poultry from China—Just Another SPS Case? 2
EUROPEAN J. OF RISK REGULATION 3, 432, (2011) (outlining the developments in SPS
law created by the US-Poultry decision).
213 See William Maudlin, U.S. Challenges China Over Chicken as Trade Friction
Rises: Obama Administration Demands that China Open its Market to U.S. Chicken,
WALL ST. J., May 10, 2016, available at http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-schallenges-china-over-chicken-as-trade-friction-rises-1462881223
[https://
perma.cc/V427-S7VB] (detailing the United States challenge to China’s trade
measure).
214 See supra note 96 at 262 (discussing the challenges that the GMOs cases
have put on the dispute settlement system).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

52

U. Pa. J. Int’l L.

[Vol. 38:1

been a learning experience; regulators have carried forward successes and make improvements in terms of standard-setting, harmonization, and equivalence. Generally the transnational governance literature shows that regulatory norms do not emerge in
isolation, but grow from public and private networks working together to create standards and regulations that are either mandates
or that get adopted informally through industry practice, industry
consensus, and/or market forces, moving across borders and regimes.215
In many ways, the TPP carries forward ‘best practices’ from
prior agreements. First, the TPP carries forward best practices
found in domestic policies. For instance, the TPP creates another
means for regulators to advance their agencies’ regulatory missions. Provisions found in the United States Food Safety and Modernization Act of 2012 are similar to the TPP rules, showing that
the TPP reinforces those rules.216 Second, the TPP also carries forward best practices found in international agreements. While previous international agreements had some safeguards in place217,
215 Greg Shaffer, Transnational Legal Process and State Change: Opportunities and
Constraints, LAW AND SOCIETY INQUIRY, 3 (2012).
See generally, Shaffer,
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDERS, supra note 37 (compiling literature on transnational governance mechanisms).
216 Compare Trans Pacific Partnership ch. 7, art. 7.10,7.12 4 February 2016,
available at [Hereinafter TPP SPS], https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/TPPFinal-Text-Sanitary-and-Phytosanitary-Measures.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YKSEDQG] (“If an importing Party requires certification for trade in a good,the
Party shall ensure that the certification requirement is applied, in meeting the
Party’ sanitary or phytosanitary objectives, only to the extent necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health”), with FDA Accreditation of ThirdParty Certification Bodies To Conduct Food Safety Audits and To Issue Certifications, 21 C.F.R. § 1.651 (2016) (requiring third-party certification bodies accredited
under this the FDA guidelines to perform unannounced facility audits and to notify the FDA upon discovering a condition that could cause or contribute to a serious risk to public health).
217 See generally North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec.
17,1991, 32 I.L.M. 289, 1114 (1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]; Treaty Between the United States of America and the Government of [Country] Concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment (Revised 2004),
http://www.sice.oas.org/trade/nafta/chap-111.asp
[https://perma.cc/8RZCVZM9] [hereinafter US Model BIT]; United States-Colombia Trade Protection
Agreement,
U.S.-Colom.,
May
15,
2015,
(2015),
http://
www.state.gov/documents/organization/117601.pdf [https://perma.cc/XM9Q8MEY]; Free Trade Agreement Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, U.S.-S. Kor., Mar. 15, 2012 (2012), http://2001-2009.state.gov/e/
eeb/tpp/c26397.htm [https://perma.cc/XM9Q-8MEY]; United States- Panama
Trade Promotion Agreement, Oct. 31, 2012 (2012), http://20012009.state.gov/e/eeb/tpp/c26397.htm [https://perma.cc/XM9Q-8MEY]; United
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modern agreements like the TPP have more safeguards for investment, competition, the environment, climate, labor, food scarcity,
and animal welfare.218 The TPP includes a dedicated chapter for
financial services trade, perhaps because countries like Chile and
Malaysia both deployed cross-border financial regulations responding to prior financial crises.219
Other best practices found in international agreements are
those found generally in the WTO SPS Agreement, and also in the
SPS Chapters in other agreements. For instance, the WTO SPS
Agreement contains a notification procedure to resolve disputes
before they reach the Panel stage. In one study, Professor Alberto
Alemano compares the number of specific trade concerns raised in
front of the Committee and the limited number of disputes litigated under the SPS Agreement and concludes that the low number of
WTO disputes can be attributed to the WTO SPS Committee notification system.220 From over 300 concerns raised to the SPS Committee, only fifteen led to established Panels.221 The TPP has a notification process similar to the deliberative process of the SPS
Committee to resolve more disputes.
In terms of higher standards, the TPP, like other modern
States-Peru Free Trade Agreement, Apr. 12, 2006, (2006), http://20012009.state.gov/e/eeb/tpp/c26397.htm [https://perma.cc/XM9Q-8MEY]; Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade America, U.S.-Dom. Rep.-Costa RicaGuat.-Hond.-Nicar.,
Jun.
30,
2005,
(2005),
https://ustr.gov/tradeagreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-dominican-republic-central-americafta/final-text [https://perma.cc/S575-JU2R]; Canadian Model Agreement for the
Promotion
and
Protection
of
Investments,
(Revised
2004),
http://www.italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A273-NTEL]; EU-Canada (CETA), India and Singapore-EC
Negotiating Mandate on Investment, E.U.-Can.-India-Sing., Sept. 15, 2011 (2011),
http://www.bilaterals.org/?eu-negotiating-mandates-on
[https://perma.cc/
C7S4-VR7N] (including safeguards for the environment and labor).
218 Many modern agreements contain chapters on competition, and other
chapters address the use of child labor, deforestation, and wildlife trafficking in
other countries to secure unfair trade advantages, in response to requests to level
the playing field among trading nations. See TPP Draft, supra note 27 at ch. 9, art.
9.16; ch. 20, art. 20.10; ch. 19, art. 19.7 (addressing issues of child labor, deforestation, and wildlife trafficking).
219 See Ricardo French-Davis, Kevin P. Gallagher, Mah-Hui Lim, and Katherine Soverel, Financial Stability and the Trans-Pacific Partnership: Lessons from Chile
and Malaysia, 6 GLOBAL POLICY 4, 330 – 342 (Nov. 2015) (elaborating on the financial stability measures included in the Trans-Pacific Partnership in relation to prior issues in Chile and Malaysia).
220 See Alemano, supra note 33 at 20 (noting that the WTO SPS Article 7 states
this requirement).
221 Id.
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agreements, provides “WTO-plus” features—features that provide
more trade protection than the WTO agreements.222 TPP SPS
Chapter 7 contains SPS protection that goes beyond protection
found in the WTO Agreements, or “WTO-plus” features.223 The
TPP goes further to increase food safety cooperation by encouraging more cooperation,224 more information sharing,225 and more dialogue in the form of annexes, ad hoc agreements, and memoranda
of understanding.226
The TPP SPS Chapter mentions that it “builds upon and reinforces” the WTO SPS Agreement.227 A study of Regional Trade
Agreements performed by the OECD found that nearly 40% of
them are ‘WTO-plus’ with the inclusion of additional specific
commitments and procedures.228 Regional and Free Trade agreements often include SPS Chapters which are “WTO-plus” in that
they bring greater standards than those afforded by the WTO, incorporating deeper SPS commitments in the form of annexes, ad
hoc agreements, and memoranda of understanding, with procedures to be followed to implement them and/or within a specified
time frame. For example, a study of the United States and European Union agreements with Korea, the United States agreement
with Panama, and the EU-CARIFORUM Agreement finds that the
SPS Chapters of United States agreements are fairly short, primari222 See Brunet Marks, supra note 31 (arguing that “WTO-plus” features generally and “SPS-plus” and “TBT-plus” features provide more than the traditional
SPS and TBT protection).
223 See id. (describing that range of standards available- the WTO provides
‘baseline’ standards, with Bilateral and Regional Trade Agreements providing
higher-than-the-baseline, SPS-plus standards, with private standards providing
the highest level of food safety).
224 See Trans Pacific Partnership, supra note 216, at art. 7.15 (encouraging parties to explore further areas of cooperation and information exchange on sanitary
and phytosanitary matters).
225 Id. at art. 7.16.
226 See e.g. Trans Pacific Partnership Related Industries, Sanitary and Phytosanitary Letters of Exchange with Chile, Canada and Vietnam. 4 February 2016,
https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/trans-pacificpartnership/tpp-full-text [https://perma.cc/D5MR-8QXX] (exchanging letters of
understanding on salmonid eggs, milk equivalence, catfish, and offals).
227 See Trans Pacific Partnership, supra note 216, at art. 7.2b (noting that the
TPP builds on and extends the WTO SPS Chapter).
228 See Fulponi, Shearer and Almeida, Regional Trade Agreements-Treatment of
Agriculture, March 31, 2011, OECD Working Paper, http://www.oecdilibrary.org/docserver/download/5kgg53fmnjxv.pdf?expires=1473730597&
id=id&accname=guest&checksum=195C94EDE3BF7FD88851E93CBFD5435C
[https://perma.cc/KDT3-MVRR].

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/1

2016]

RIGHT TO REGULATE

55

ly functioning to establish a bilateral committee for consultation
and coordination for understanding one another’s SPS measures
and their implementation and to set out responsibilities to establish
the committee and hold its meetings. Both agreements exempt
their SPS chapters from regional dispute settlement procedures.
Side agreements on equivalency are part of the WTO-plus. For
example, a side agreement to the United States Free Trade Agreement (FTA) with Panama included Panama’s recognition of United
States SPS and related regulatory systems as equivalent to Panama’s for meat, poultry, dairy and processed products.229 A side
agreement to the US-Colombia FTA and US-Peru FTA included
recognition of United States meat and poultry inspection system as
equivalent and to accept USDA export certificates.230 Sometimes
countries want to negotiate bilaterally. A good example is China,
who sought to resolve the poultry equivalence issue with the United States long before it sought to bring it to the multilateral
WTO.231 The TPP continues a United States tradition of adding
side agreements to Free Trade Agreements. The TPP contains five
side agreements that are SPS-related—one between United States
and Chile regarding Salmonid Eggs, one between United States
and Canada regarding equivalence for milk, and two between the
United States and Vietnam on catfish and offals (variety meats), respectively.232
While the SPS Chapters that the United States drafts are similar
to one another, SPS Chapters that the European Union drafts are
different from the United States and also from one another.233 The
European Union has Agreements that establish committees,234 and
229 See Agreement Regarding Certain Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures and
Technical Standards Affecting Trade in Agriculture Products, in BILATERAL AND
REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: COMMENTARY AND ANALYSIS, Simon Lester, Bryan
Mercurio (eds.) (2008) at xxviii.
230 See id. at 30 (explaining annexes and ad hoc agreements includes in the SPS
commitments).
231 See Gruszczynski, supra note 212 (discussing the timeline and challenges
behind the US-Poultry SPS case).
232 See TPP SPS, supra note 216 (containing letters of exchange between the
U.S. and Chile, Canada, and Vietnam on regulation of certain foods).
233 See Agreement Regarding Certain Sanitary, supra note 229 at 152.
234 The EU-Korea agreement establishes an on-going committee and places
attention to be determining pest-or disease-free areas by a two year ‘confidencebuilding activity’, to be confirmed by the WTO SPS Committee. If a party rejects
the determination of the other, the parties may begin consultations with each
agreeing to be open for inspection, testing and other procedures.
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some that do not.235 There is a trend to include provisions on mutual recognition in international agreements.236
4.2. Mega-Regionals Provide New Mechanisms for Regulatory
Cooperation
Mega-Regionals are a relatively new and unexplored phenomenon, judging from an emerging literature of primarily economic
working papers and studies predicting gains and losses.237 But as a
new mechanism for cooperative regulation, they show great promise. These agreements are expansive and provide regulatory flexibility (the ‘right to regulate’)238 in a number of areas: to regulate in
235 See Agreement Regarding Certain Sanitary, supra note 229 at 152. (commenting that the EU-CARIFORUM agreement does not have a committee but focuses
more on cooperation for technical assistance for SPS-type measures within the region and to promoting harmonization of standards with the possibility of bilateral
equivalency agreements).
236 The Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation Mutual Recognition Agreement
represents an improved example of a multilateral agreement. The APEC Mutual
Recognition Arrangement of Food and Food Products consists of a framework arrangement and separate implementation arrangements. In these Arrangements
the importer accepts that food conforms to the other party’s requirements. See
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, supra note 23 (analyzing the overall impact of megaregional agreements on among other things, food safety measures).
237 See Brook K. Baker & Katrina Geddes, Corporate Power Unbound: InvestorState Arbitration of Intellectual Property Monopolies: Eli Lilly v. Canada and the Trans
Pacific Partnership, in NE. PUB. L. AND THEORY FACULTY RESEARCH PAPERS SERIES 422015 (2015) (addressing Intellectual Property and the TPP); Mega-Regional Trade
Agreements, Game Changers or Costly Distractions for the World Trading System,
WORLD
ECONOMIC
FORUM
(July
2014),
http://www3.weforum.org/
docs/GAC/2014/WEF_GAC_TradeFDI_MegaRegionalTradeAgreements_Report
_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/KL5B-2GG5] (discussing the utility of MegaRegional Trade Agreements); Remy Jurenas, How Could Mega-Regional Trade Negotiations Affect Agriculture and Food Trade (Int’l Ctr. for Trade and Sustainable Dev.,
Issue Paper No. 57, 2015), http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/
research/How%20Could%20Mega-Regional%20Trade%20Negotiations%
20Affect%20Agricultural%20and%20Food%20Trade.pdf [https://perma.cc/7F6BU6SF] (explaining how Mega-Regional Trade Negotiations affect food trade); David A. Gantz, The TPP and RCEP: Mega Trade Agreements for the Pacific Rim, Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No. 15-36 (2015), published at 33 Ariz. J. Int’l &
Comp. L. 57 (2016) (explaining the impact of Mega-Regional trade agreements on
non-parties); see also Dan Ciuriak & Harsha Vardhana Singh, Mega Regional Trade
Agreements: How Excluded Countries Can Meet the Challenge 8 (2015),
http://www.ipekpp.com/admin/upload_files/Report_3_54_Mega_6009607286.p
df [https://perma.cc/8VLS-SKC3] (including a review of economic studies calculating gains and losses).
238 Other mega regionals, however, have the ‘right to regulate’ language ex-
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the public interest,239 for financial stability, for the environment,”240,
and for public health.241 Even more, the TPP requires new, more
committed levels of cooperation compared to looser forms of cooperation found in other agreements (such as principles-based international standards, information sharing, research collaboration, international early warning systems, and capacity building).
Most importantly, however, the TPP breaks with prior economic treaty conventions in that it introduces three new mechanisms for
cooperation.242 First, the TPP responds directly to the need for a
more deliberative process for SPS related issues by adding a new
due process element for countries to discuss issues of concern: a
‘Cooperative Technical Consultation’.243 This feature is a mechanism for a quick determination on an SPS dispute between members before resorting to the dispute settlement provisions of the
agreement or to the WTO. While the TPP does not specifically
plicitly in the text. The draft TTIP includes language specific to the “right to regulate”: Article 2 affirms that the provisions “shall not affect the right of Parties to
regulate within their territories through measures necessary to achieve legitimate
policy objectives, such as the protection of public health, safety, environment or
public morals, social or consumer protection or promotion and protection of cultural diversity.” See European Commission Releases Draft Proposal on TTIP Investment
Court,
BRIDGES
WEEKLY
(Sept.
7,
2015),
http://
www.ictsd.org/sites/default/files/review/bridgesweekly19-30.pdf
[https://
perma.cc/7QCJ-W979] (demonstrating that a newly elected official has the ‘right
to regulate’ policy in Australia).
239 See Att’y Gen.’s Dep’t, Gov’t of Austl., Tobacco Plain Packaging— Investor
Arbitration, https://www.ag.gov.au/tobaccoplainpackaging [https://perma.cc/
KX8N-U8HL] (last visited Oct. 5, 2016) (discussing the public health concerns behind the passage of a Tobacco Act in Australia).
240 See Hale, supra note 15 (commenting on the opening remarks to the TPP
Investment Chapter); see also Tradewinds, The Official Blog of the USTR, (March
2014), https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/blog/2014/March/
Facts-Investor-State%20Dispute-Settlement-Safeguarding-Public-InterestProtecting-Investors [https://perma.cc/4SW4-35H9] (explaining how the United
States’ trade agreements protect Americans doing business in the United States).
241 Public health measures are described in the TPP with reference to adopting tobacco control measures in order to protect public health. Member parties
cannot use the Investment Chapter to bring investment claims against one another’s tobacco control measures.
242 See Simon Lester & Inu Barbee, The Challenge of Cooperation: Regulatory
Trade Barriers in the Transatlantic and Investment Partnership, 16 J. OF INT’L ECON. L.
847-867 (2013) (noting that some claims of potential benefits of the TTIP are overstated, but facilitating regulatory cooperation is nevertheless very much worth
undertaking).
243 See TPP SPS, supra note 215, at ch. 7, art. 7.17 (outlining the protocols and
procedures countries must follow regarding sanitary and phytosanitary
measures).
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mention nanotechnology, one could foresee importing countries
establishing SPS measures (for example, labeling measures)
that are not scientifically based on nanofoods and nanotechnology (the European Union already has a moratorium on
nanofoods and labeling requirements, so countries also adhering
to the precautionary principle could potentially do the same)244.
If United States exports incorporating nanotechnology are
banned, United States regulations on food additives (where Codex
sets a standard) and nanotechnology (where Codex does not set a
standard) could come under review under the ‘Cooperative Technical Consultations’ provision.245
Second, the TPP contains a ‘Regulatory Coherence Chapter’, a
new feature to trade agreements, as an explicit and strong commitment to regulatory cooperation.246 Although much of the Regulatory Coherence Chapter needs to be further clarified, chapters
like this are not found in traditional (WTO) agreements and the
TPP is the first international agreement to have such a Chapter.
This Chapter expressly promotes regulatory cooperation arguing
for the “use of good regulatory practices in the process of planning,
designing issuing, implementing and reviewing regulatory
measures in order to facilitate achievement of domestic policy objectives, and in efforts across governments to enhance regulatory
cooperation.”247 The use of good regulatory practices includes
performing ‘impact assessments” when developing proposed covered regulatory measures, that “examine feasible alternatives” and
their “costs and benefits” – in essence, this means adopting notice
and comment procedures, enhanced stakeholder participation, access to information and mutual consultation.248 A Committee on
Regulatory Coherence is to be formed and cooperation encouraged
244 Novel Foods: MEPs Call for Moratorium on Nano-Foods and Labelling of Cloned
Meat,
European
Parliament
News
(Nov.
25,
2014),
http://
www.europarl.europa.eu/pdfs/news/expert/infopress/20141125IPR80424/
20141125IPR80424_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/HC4Z-2CQL] (explaining that
“MEPs nonetheless amended the text and proposed a moratorium on the use of
nanomaterials in food, based on the precautionary principle. They also added
provisions for compulsory labelling of cloned food products”).
245 See TPP SPS, supra note 234, at ch. 7, art. 7.17 (outlining the Cooperative
Technical Cooperations procedures).
246 See Trans Pacific Partnership ch. 25, Feb. 4 2016 [Hereinafter TPP RC]
[https://perma.cc/2YKS-EDQG] (announcing the regulatory coherence provisions of the TPP).
247 Id. at 25.2(1).
248 Id. at 25.5(2).
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and strengthened through “information exchanges, training programs, and other relevant activities between regulatory agencies”.249 These may allow parties to resolve frictions earlier, before
a regulatory dispute escalates. Third, the TPP includes a Market
Access Chapter, which includes a section on bioengineering and
additives250 —areas which have been ripe for regulatory collisions.
In light of complaints (from the European Union) over trade in genetically modified organisms, the United States drafted language
in the TPP to preempt any future complaints from countries espousing similar views as the European Union in this realm. Finally, another Chapter entitled, “Trade in Products of Modern Biotechnology”, notes that products derived from agricultural
biotechnology are grown in 28 countries, traded widely, and that
the “TPP includes commitments to provide transparency on government measures on biotechnology trade”.251 It also provides for
information sharing and procedures for Parties to follow when the
low-level presence of biotech material is detected in a shipment of
agricultural commodities or food products. 252
Finally, the TPP contains other features to nudge countries toward regulatory cooperation. The TPP Chapter on Labor, Chapter
19, contains labor protection regulations which, if not adopted and
implemented, allow the United States to withhold or suspend tariff
reductions specified in the treaty.253
An example regarding GMOs best illustrates how these TPP
features may operate. Recognizing that issues with GMOs have
been raised in the WTO in the past and are a continuing concern in trade negotiations,254 one could imagine other TPP
Id. at 25.7(1).
See Trans Pacific Partnership ch. 2 Feb. 2016, [Hereinafter TPP National
Treatment] [https://perma.cc/2YKS-EDQG] (explaining procedures followed related to agricultural goods made using modern biotechnology).
251 See Id. at art. 2.32 (outlining the transparency measures within the TPP).
252 Id.
253 See Trans Pacific Partnership ch. 19 Feb. 2016, [Hereinafter TPP Labor]
[https://perma.cc/2YKS-EDQG] (containing a letter between U.S. and Vietnam
for Enhancement of Trade and Labor Relations); see also id. at §V(B)(VIII) (explaining that the Review of Implementation states that the United States may withhold
or suspend any TPP tariff reductions should Vietnam not uphold labor liberalization provisions).
254 See US Officials 'Disappointed' the EU Wants to Let Member States Decide
Whether to Allow GMO Products, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 24, 2015),
http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-us-says-new-eu-plan-for-gmo-imports-isno-solution-2015-4 [https://perma.cc/M385-VGWA] (noting EU proposal to allow the 28 member states to individually decide whether to allow the import of
249
250
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Members requiring labeling of GMOs in food (following the European Union precautionary principle model). A TPP Member
could raise a concern with GMO labeling rules in another TPP
Member by invoking the TPP SPS Agreement, under the ‘Cooperative Technical Consultations’ provision.255 This same issue
could also be raised in the TPP Market Access Chapter, under the
section on “products of biotechnology” which establishes a mechanism for importing countries to decide on product safety and establishes a working group for the topic.256 However, even before a
Member country implements a new rule, countries are to inform
each other of new rules under the Regulatory Coherence Chapter
and a Committee on Regulatory Coherence will review impact assessments and cost benefit analyses. In this way, regulatory cooperation takes place before and after rule-making through special
cooperative committees, and even then, in some cases (labor) treaty
benefits are rescinded before the onset of a trade dispute under the
dispute settlement provisions in the TPP Agreement or under the
WTO.
While Mega-Regionals represent an evolution towards more
regulatory cooperation, positive and negative externalities are inevitable.
5. EXTERNALITIES
While mechanisms aimed at cooperative regulation result in
positive externalities, such as regulatory coherence, there are potential negative externalities, such as limits to policy space and scientific examination.
5.1. Positive Externalities
Regulatory coordination, marked by the use of harmonization,
standard-setting, and recognition of equivalence has several potential benefits. Regulatory cooperation has the potential to reduce
genetically modified organisms or food, animal feed and other products made
with them).
255 See TPP SPS, supra note 215, at ch. 7, art. 17 (outlining the protocols and
procedures countries must follow regarding sanitary and phytosanitary
measures).
256 See TPP National Treatment, supra note 252, at ch. 2.
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regulatory collisions and imminent collisions in the WTO. It also
has the potential to raise standards not only within the TPP but beyond the TPP by encouraging exports from Regional Trade
Agreement-based firms to nations outside of the agreement.257
One example of this is the European Union’s Global System for
Mobile Communications standard.258 When 300 million European
consumers embraced this standard, many non-European Union nations embraced it as well. Developing countries adhere to standards that are more appropriate to wealthier counterparts. Regulatory coherence aided Nokia and other European Union firms to
compete in developing countries and overall, it helped European
Union firms win the global standards competition.
Generally, regulatory coherence spanning geographic areas the
size of the TPP tends to spill over into countries outside of the
agreement. For example, Switzerland and Norway are not members of the European Union but adopted European Union Single
Market standards as they emerged.259 In food safety, harmonization has led to many benefits such as enhanced trade, possible enhanced food safety, and again, positive spillovers to countries outside of the agreement.
5.2. Negative Externalities
Five negative externalities related to IRC deserve mention, such
as limiting regulatory innovation, restricting transparency, fostering technoimperialism, and moving away from the scientific
standard.
First, international regulatory harmonization at the level of nation-states may be unattainable or undesirable260 based on several
257 See Joseph Francois et al., Reducing Transatlantic Barriers to Trade and Investment: An Economic Assessment, Study for the European Commission, CEPR
REPORT (2013) (assessing the impact of reduced trade barriers on TPP nations and
third nations like Indonesia).
258 See Mobile Technology GSM, EUROPEAN TECH. STANDARDS INS. (2016)
http://www.etsi.org/technologies-clusters/technologies/mobile/gsm
[https://perma.cc/8LCE-SEF3] (providing a definition of the Global System
Communication Standard).
259 See Francois, supra note 257, at 29 (discussing the role of the EU as a trading partner, encouraging others to adopt its standards).
260 See generally Annelise Riles, Managing Regulatory Arbitrage: An Alternative
to Harmonization in CORNELL L. FACULTY PUB. PAPER 880 (2013),
http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/
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negative externalities, such as the losses to regulatory innovation,
transparency, and strict scientific examination. Professor Riles argues that in financial regulation there are discrete benefits from
maintaining a diverse group of inconsistent regulations.261 Professors Weiner and Alemanno defend regulatory heterogeneity by
highlighting innovation benefits.262 Proponents of heterogeneity
and the way in which IRC generates harmonized substantive regulatory requirements has been to focus IRC on less-intrusive regulatory objectives, including cooperation on regulatory impact analysis (RIA) and risk-assessment processes, and to focus on intensive
consultation and information-sharing.263
Second, the TPP has the potential to limit transparency for
some countries. The TPP involves negotiation between key economic actors—nation-states, private parties (investors), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—with each actor commanding influence and driving certain priorities. For a glimpse into investor priorities in the right to medicines debate, one only needs to
look at the influential role of the pharmaceutical sector (“Big
Pharma”) in influencing the Intellectual Property Chapters of the
TPP (e.g., pushing for restraining competition in the trade of biologics).264
Third, the negotiations involve a heterogeneous mix of developed and developing countries negotiating to meet a consensus. In
the TPP, negotiations between the United States (a developed
country example) and Vietnam (a developing country example) involved multiple concessions.265 The lack of developing country input into the formation of standards translates into what some obcgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2378&context=facpub
[https://perma.cc/VNT63UL5] (confronting the prevailing wisdom that regulatory arbitrage can be counteracted only if the rules across all legal systems are harmonized, stating that
‘choice of law’ can be used to address persistent regulatory differences).
261 Id.
262 See Jonathan B. Wiener & Alberto Alemanno, The Future of International
Regulatory Cooperation: TTIP as a Learning Process Toward a Global Policy Laboratory,
78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS., No. 4, 2015 (stating that regulatory heterogeneity is important for innovation—countries can experiment and be laboratories for experimentation).
263 See Bull et al., New Approaches, supra note 34, at 15 (discussing the use of
cooperation on regulatory impact analysis as a less intrusive objective).
264 See supra note 115.
265 See US–Vietnam Plan for Enhancement of Trade and Labor Relations, Trans Pacific Partnership ch. 19 Feb. 2016 (presenting letters exchanged between the United States and Vietnam in the negotiation process).
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servers have called ‘technoimperialism’, or the imposition of standards by rich countries upon poor ones.266 Finally, nations may lose
their authority to regulate on public health matters due to the heterogeneity in the provisions negotiated. Agreements cover so
much ground that ‘a gain in one chapter’ is ‘a loss in another’.
Fourth, in some areas, the TPP SPS Agreement itself may provide for less working autonomy to regulate. For intellectual property protection, the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) states, “Members shall be free
to determine the appropriate method of implementing the provisions of the Agreement within their own legal system and practice.”267 The SPS Agreement is not as broad as this TRIPS Agreement provision; however, the SPS Agreement provides less
autonomy to regulate from the start. When Professor Frankel asserts, “all of the international negotiations and agreements over intellectual property have the cumulative effect of curbing national
autonomy that the TRIPS agreement naturally allows,”268 the same
is less relevant for the SPS Agreement. Compared to the TRIPS
Agreement, there was less autonomy with the SPS from the beginning.
Fifth, the movement toward a Mega-Regional, and its many
committees and consultation avenues for dispute-resolution, can
be viewed as a movement away from a scientific standard (and
counterintuitively towards the precautionary principle).269 The
WTO has historically been viewed as a science-based framework.
And yet, there are those who see this science-based framework as
overly restrictive270 and others who argue that factors outside of
See FAO/WHO Expert Meeting, supra note 6, at 1949.
See Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 1994, 33
I.L.M. 82, 84 – 85 (1994) (providing that “members shall give effect to the provisions of this Agreement. Members may, but shall not be obligated to, implement
in their law more extensive protection than is required by this Agreement, provided that such protection does not contravene the provisions of this Agreement.
Members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of this Agreement within their own legal system and practice.”)
268 Susy Frankel, Eroding National Autonomy from the TRIPS Agreement, in
INT’L ECON. L. AND NAT’L AUTONOMY 114 (Meredity Kolsky Lewis & Susy Frankel
eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2010).
269 I thank Hillary Allen for raising this point.
270 See Alan O. Sykes, Domestic Regulation, Sovereignty, and Scientific Evidence
Requirements, a Pessimistic View, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 353, 354 (2002) (arguing that the
scientific benchmark represents undue hurtles for regulators who sincerely pursue objectives other than protectionism). But see Robert Hudec, Science and PostDiscriminatory WTO Law, 26 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 185, 189 (2003) (discussing
266
267
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science should drive regulation.271 As Tracey Epps notes, “one of
the key questions raised regarding the scientific evidence benchmark is its appropriateness in democracies where public sentiment
finds a risk worthy of regulation contrary to the views of experts.”272 Any scientific process, she argues, “is in fact highly indeterminate, subjective and vulnerable to manipulation and capture
by protectionist interests”273; science may not be the best, but it is
the best we have.

6. CONCLUSIONS
In an era of emerging technologies in food production, countries want to preserve their right to regulate food safety risks. But
in reality, countries operate in a free trade framework where challenges to domestic regulations in the WTO and other venues are
common. In this context, countries shop for new agreements that
enable them to maintain regulatory flexibility and also provide coordination of efforts internationally to ensure food safety.
This Article argues that traditional models of international regulatory cooperation are failing to provide the regulatory cooperation countries need. Mega-Regionals, with the TPP as the leading
exemplar, provide a new promising mechanism for IRC and a way
the interaction between science and WTO law); Jeffery Atik, Science and International Regulatory Convergence, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 736, 758 (1997) (explaining
that science can sometimes alter decision-makers regulatory actions); Vern Walker, The Myth of Science as a Neutral Arbiter for Triggering Precautions, 26 B.C. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 197, 228 (2003) (demonstrating that “science can[not] serve as a
‘neutral arbiter’ for triggering precautionary measures.”). Presumably this was in
response to political pressure arising out of the aforementioned Phillip Morris
case.
271 Other critics are concerned with the apparent exclusion by the SPS
Agreement of non-scientific justifications for measures, arguing that reliance on
science is misplaced because it precludes any consideration of social, cultural and
ethical concerns and that nations will find their sovereignty diminished if there is
no space for consumer anxieties to be respected and domestic politics accommodated. See Dayna Nadine Scott, Nature/Culture Clash: The Transnational Trade Debate Over GMOs 42 (New York: Hauser Global Law Program, Global Law Working Paper 06/05, 2005) (arguing that factors other than science should drive
regulation); see also Walker, supra note 270, at 225 (“Non-scientific decisions are
inherent in the findings about risk needed to justify precautionary measures under the SPS Agreement”).
272 Epps, supra note 134, at 299.
273 Id.
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to achieve higher food safety outcomes.
The TPP provides new mechanisms to help complete the ‘wish
list’ for regulatory cooperation, carries forward best practices from
prior agreements such as “WTO-plus” features that go beyond the
protections in the WTO agreement, and introduces other novel features that raise food safety. Innovations include a new due process
panel, the ‘SPS Technical Consultation’ feature, a ‘Regulatory Coherence’ Chapter with an explicit call to encourage regulatory cooperation, and a Market Access Chapter with special provisions
addressing cooperation with respect to trade in biotechnology and
food additives. Through provisions and Chapters, the TPP provides for more regulatory cooperation—facilitating dialogue, information sharing, deliberative processes, consultation, international standards, mutual recognition agreements—in ways that
will raise food safety.
While positive spillovers are likely to include adoption of higher standards to facilitate trade with Mega-Regional Members, and
higher standards with countries outside of the agreement, negative
externalities such as losses to regulatory innovation, transparency
and strict scientific examination, are noted. This is important as
new agreements, provisions, and chapters, will be modeled after
the TPP; a glimpse into the negotiations on the China-Australia
Free Trade Agreement reveals many provisions, including safeguards to protect Australian labor upon Chinese investment, similar to those found in the TPP.274
Addendum: Since the inception of this Article, we have witnessed a
noteworthy shift toward widespread popular discontent with the institutions of international economic law, and their role in globalization. Recent
events show that in the United States and Europe, the future of trade
agreements is in doubt. In the United States, the Trans-Pacific Partnership talks are stalled with President-elect Donald Trump promising to
withdraw the United States from TPP on his first day in office, and in
Europe, ‘Brexit’ talks are escalating. While this tumultuous time may be
difficult for international economic lawyers, it also represents an opportunity to openly discuss new agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Part274 See Australian Lawmakers Review Possible Compromise for China Trade
Deal Ratification, INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE AND SUSTAINABLE DEV., Bridges, Volume
19, number 32. (Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.ictsd.org/sites/default/
files/review/bridgesweekly19-34.pdf [https://perma.cc/6BC3-XWE4] (announcing proposed changes to Australia’s Migration Act).
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nership—balancing their strengths alongside their weaknesses. Looking
forward, this Article provides policymakers with a way to view the TransPacific Partnership, and others agreements like it—as vehicles aimed at
cementing high standards on controversial issues related to food safety,
across an increasingly important regional value chains, using new mechanisms for regulatory cooperation.
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Table 1: SPS Disputes

WTO Case
EC-Hormones

Australia-Salmon

Japan-Agricultural
Products II

Japan-Apples

Australia-Fresh Fruit
and Vegetable
Australia-Quarantine
Regime
EU-Biotech

US-Continued Suspension

Australia-Apples

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016

Case Description
A complaint by the United States and
Canada regarding the European Union
ban on meat treated with growth promoting hormones.
Complaints by the United States and
Canada against Australia’s restrictions
on imports of fresh, chilled or frozen
salmon.
A United States complaint to examine
Japan’s requirement that each variety
of certain fruits be tested with regard
to the efficacy of fumigation treatment.
A United States complaint to examine
Japan’s restriction on apples due to
‘fire blight’.
A Philippines complaint to examine
Australia’s quarantine procedures.
Complaints by the European Union
against Australia’s quarantine procedures.
Complaints by the United States, Canada and Argentina concerning European Community measures affecting
the approval and marketing of biotech
products.
Complaints by the European Community against the United States and
Canada on their continued suspension
of obligations relating to the ECHormones dispute.
A New Zealand complaint to examine
Australia’s restrictions on apples.
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US-COOL

US-Poultry

Korea-Bovine Meat
(Canada)

Complaints by Canada and Mexico regarding the United States on the Certain Country of Origin Labeling Requirements.
A Chinese complaint to examine United States measures affecting imports of
poultry.
A Canadian complaint to examine Korea’s measures affecting the importation of bovine meat and meat products.

Table 2: International Regulatory Cooperation Techniques

Technique
1.) Fully
Uncoordinated
Regulatory
Heterogeneity
2.) Dialogue

3.) Procedural Soft Law

4.) Private codes

5.) Intergovernmental Reliance on Private Codes

6.) Transgovernmental
Networks

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol38/iss1/1

Description

Food Safety Example

--

--

Informal exchange of
information to foster
mutual understanding
Cooperation among
states based on nonlegally binding instruments
Coordinated technical
standards adopted by
multinational private
standards organizations
The incorporation of
international private
codes into national legislative instruments
Cooperation among
agencies or units of national governments

Transatlantic
Economic Council,
Infosan
OECD guidelines and
principles, Global SalmSurv, OZFoodNet, Infosan
GlobalGAP, International Standards Organization (ISO)
Global Food Safety Initiative, in the FSMA rules

Global Salm-Surv,

2016]

7.) Mutual Recognition
Agreements

8.) International Agreements
9.) Membership in International Organizations
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RIGHT TO REGULATE
based on frequent interaction by peers (not
treaties)
In national regulatory
law retaining different
national standards but
agreeing to allow market access upon approval by the other jurisdiction’s regulatory
authority
Multilateral accords to
reduce regulatory barriers to trade
Promote regulatory cooperation

US-China Equivalence
agreement with on Poultry

WTO

Codex

10.) Formal Regulatory
Partnerships

Formal arrangements

US-Canada Regulatory
Cooperation Council

11.) Integration and
Harmonization Through
a Given supranational/Joint Institution
12.) Joint Regulator

Agreement to adopt the
same regulatory standard in each national
regulation
A single regulatory
agency to promulgate
joint regulations with
standards covering two
or more jurisdictions
--

U.S. federal legislation
on food safety applied
through member states.
Or EU Directives.
The Joint Food Standards
Australia and New Zealand

13.) A Single Global Regulatory Law

--

Source: Column 1 & 2, Reeve Bull et al; Column 3, Brunet Marks
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